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ABSTRACT

The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to grant to inventors
exclusive rights to their inventions. Accordingly, 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) states that every
patent grants to the patentee exclusive rights to make and use their inventions, and
35 U.S.C. § 283 provides that a court may grant injunctions in accordance with the
principles of equity. The Federal Circuit developed a general standard that a
permanent injunction should issue, except in extraordinary standards, after a patent
is judicially declared valid. However, in May 2006, the Supreme Court overruled
that standard in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C., declaring that the traditional
four-pronged test of equity must be applied in patent cases. This article reviews
Federal Circuit and district court patent cases that were faced with whether to grant
preliminary or permanent injunctions after eBay.
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INJUNCTIONS IN PATENT CASES AFTER EBAY
EDWARD D. MANZO*

INTRODUCTION

The patent statute says that courts may enter injunctions in patent cases but
does not set forth the conditions for them. 1 The Federal Circuit developed a general
rule stating an injunction will follow a finding of infringement, 2 but on May 15, 2006,
in eBay Ine. v. MereExehange, L.L.C, 3 the Supreme Court overruled this rule. 4 This
paper reviews eBay and its effects on courts deciding whether to grant preliminary or
permanent injunctions in patent cases.
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shareholders of Cook Alex (Cook, Alex, MeFarron, Manzo, Cummings & Mehler, Ltd.), an IP law
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originated and edited Claim Construction in the Federal Circuit,published by Thomson West-West
LegalWorks, which focuses on patent claim construction law in the United States. He is a frequent
lecturer on patent law for Law Seminars Int'l., West LegalWorks, Practicing Law Institute, IPLAC,
American Intellectual Property Law Association, Association of Patent Law Firms, and DePaul law
school, and he has participated in or led several programs at John Marshall Law School. He
developed patent portfolios which yielded royalties well exceeding $100 million and have been
litigated several times, and he has negotiated on the order of 100 patent licenses. He has published
on or spoken about patent claim construction, injunctions, obviousness, declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, willful infringement, active inducement, damages, licensing, written description
requirements, design patents, laches and estoppel, means-plus-function claims, patent examiner
testimony, IP law in the retail sector, and general principles of IP law. He has been interviewed on
legal issues on television, in audio programs, and in the press. He serves on the Patents
Subcommittee of the Pattern Jury Instruction Committee for the Seventh Circuit (2005-date) and is

listed in Who's Who in the World, Who's Who in America, ljlinois Suporawyers, and elsewhere. He
is admitted to the bars of the State of New York, State of Illinois, numerous federal trial and
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1 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
2 Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating "[i]t is the
general rule that an injunction will issue when infringement has been adjudged, absent a sound
reason for denying it").
3 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
4 Id. at 1841.
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I. INJUNCTIONS AND EBAY

The U.S. Constitution provides for a patent right that is exelusive: "The
Congress shall have power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 5 The patent statute enacted by Congress in
1952 pursuant to this provision states in section 154 that each patent shall "contain
... the right to exclude others from using, offering for sale or selling [the
invention] .... "6 However, section 283 specifies that courts having jurisdiction "may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation
7
of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."
Harmonization of these provisions is necessary, and from some of the language as
written, it would seem that the right to exclude is not unconditional but subject to
equitable principles.
Many inventors, patent litigators, and other practitioners feel that after patent
infringement is judicially established, they are entitled to exclude the infringer and
that it is equitable to do so in all but the most compelling of instances where, for
example, public health or other important needs would be jeopardized by the
injunction. 8 They are, therefore, surprised by the ruling in eBay, where a unanimous
Supreme Court rejected the "general rule" of the Federal Circuit that a permanent
injunction should issue after patent infringement is judicially established except in
extraordinary situations. 9 The Supreme Court remanded the case for further
determinations, with no opinion on the merits, declaring that the traditional fourpronged test of equity must be applied in patent cases, just as with others. 10
In eBay, plaintiff MercExchange held a number of patents including a business
method patent for an electronic market.11 It had licensed others and sought to
license eBay. A jury found the patent valid, infringed, and that damages were
appropriate. 12 However, the district court denied the patentee's motion for injunctive
relief. 13 The Federal Circuit reversed, applying its general rule that courts should
issue permanent injunctions in patent cases except in exceptional circumstances. 14
The relatively short opinion for the Supreme Court was written by Justice
Thomas and noted several points. First, the four-factor test for equitable relief does
apply:
According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test before a court may
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
U
6 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (emphasis added).
7 Id. § 283 (emphasis added).
8 See Damian Myers, Reeling in the Patent Troll.* Was eBay v. MercExchange Enough, 14 J.
INTELL. PRoP. L. 333, 340 (2007) (indicating that patent owners often desire injunctive relief to halt
infringing activity).
9 eBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1841.
10

Id.

11Id at 1839.
12MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 559 (E.D. Va. 2007), rev'd,401 F.3d
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006).
13

Id, at 591.

14MereExchange, 401 F.3d at 1338-39, vacated, 126 S. Ct. 1837.
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grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering
the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved
by a permanent injunction. The decision to grant or deny permanent
injunctive relief is an act of equitable discretion by the district court,
reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion. 15
Second, any major departure from established equity practice "should not lightly
be implied." 16 Third, the patent statute at section 283 says that courts "may" grant
injunctions "in accordance with the principles of equity ....,
Implicitly,
injunctions are not requiredby this statutory language. Fourth, as the Court saw it,
the creation of a right, in this instance the "right to exclude" set forth in section 154,
is distinct from the provision of remedies for violating that right.18 Fifth, the Court
had already confirmed that in copyright cases, the four-factor test applies, even
though the Copyright Act like the Patent Act grants a right to exclude: "And as in our
decision today, this Court has consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional
equitable considerations with a rule that an injunction automatically follows a
determination that a copyright has been infringed." 19
Here, the district court erred by not fully considering the irreparable harm
aspect of the case. It applied too rigid a test for an injunction and appeared to adopt
certain expansive principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in a
broad swath of cases. Most notably, it concluded that a "plaintiffs willingness to
license its patents" and "its lack of commercial activity in practicing the patents"
would be sufficient to establish that the patent holder would not suffer irreparable
harm if an injunction did not issue. But traditional equitable principles do not
20
permit such broad classifications.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court noted that small inventors and university
researchers, who may prefer to license their patents, "may be able to satisfy the
traditional four-factor test."21 The Federal Circuit's (perceived) categorical rule is in
tension with principles of equity adopted by Congress. 22 On the side of enforcing the
right to exclude, the Supreme Court denied that courts of equity have no jurisdiction
to grant injunctions even when patentees have unreasonably refused to use the
patent. 23 In other words, while permanent injunctions are not mandatory, neither is
compulsory licensing of U.S. patents.

15 oBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1839 (citations omitted).
1i Id.
17 35 U.S.C.
18

§ 283 (2006).

oBay, 126 S. Ct. at 1840.

19Id. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 505 (2001) (citing Campbell v. Acuff
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578, n. 10 (1994)); Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Assn., 209 U.S. 20,

23-24 (1908).
20
21

22
23

Id.(citation omitted).
Id.
d

Id.(citing Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422-30 (1908)).
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The Supreme Court faulted the Federal Circuit for using too liberal a rule for
determining injunctions, stating that it is improper to have any categorical rule in
deciding this question of equity. 24 Finally, the decision whether to grant or deny an
injunction rests in the district court's discretion, which must be exercised in
accordance with traditional principles of equity.25
One concurring opinion was written by Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
Scalia and Ginsburg, and commented that the long tradition of granting injunctions
in patent cases was hardly surprising "given the difficulty of protecting a right to
exclude through monetary remedies." 26 The Chief Justice also noted the basic
27
principle "that like cases should be decided alike."

Another concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer, took a different view and asserted that the "traditional practice
of issuing injunctions against patent infringers ...

does not seem to rest on 'the

difficulty of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies ...."'28
Moreover, "historical practice [cited by the Chief Justice] ...is most helpful and
instructive" when the case circumstances are substantially parallel. 29 However, in
current cases, trial courts should consider the nature of the patent being enforced
and the economic function of the patent holder, as these may present considerations
quite different from earlier cases. 30 Thus, patents on business methods were not of
much economic and legal significance in earlier times. 31 Additionally, Justice
Kennedy cautioned that the patented invention may be only a small component of the
product, and the threat of injunction may be employed to achieve undue leverage in
negotiations. 32 In such cases, legal damages may well be enough to compensate for
33
the infringements, and an injunction might not serve the public interest.

II. TABLES OF POST-EBAY CASES RE INJUNCTIONS
eBay has made courts consider the equities more closely, and it has become
somewhat more difficult for a prevailing patent owner to obtain an injunction against
an infringer. Even so, permanent injunctions were granted about two-thirds of the
time. Preliminary injunctions were denied slightly more often than they were
granted.

24 Id. at 1841.
25 Id.
26 Id.(Roberts, C.J., concurring).
27 Id. at 1841-42 (Roberts, C.J.,

concurring) (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546
U.S. 132, 139 (2005)).
28 Id.at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing majority opinion).
29 d
30 Id.
31

Id

32 Id
33 Id.
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Preliminary Injunction Granted/Retained
" Canon Inc. v. GCCInternationalLtd.
" ChamberlainGroup, Inc. v. Lear Corp.
" ChristianaIndustries v. Empire
Electronics,Inc.
* Seitz v. Envirotech Systems Worldwide
Inc.

Permanent Injunction Granted
• 3Mlnnovative PropertiesCo. v. A very
Dennison Corp.
• 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Securities,
Ltd.
• Allan Block Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co.
• Black & Decker, Inc. v. Robert Bosch
Tool Corp.
• Brooktrout, Inc. vs. Eicon Networks
Corp.
• Commonwealth Scientific and
IndustrialResearch Organisationv.
Buffalo Technology Inc.
- Erico InternationalCorp. v. Doc's
Marketing,Inc.
- Floe International,Inc. v. Newmans'
ManufacturingInc.
- MGM Well Services, Inc. v. Mega Lift
Systems, L.L. C.
0 MPT, Inc. v. MarathonLabels, Inc.
- Novozymes A/S v. Genencor
International,Inc.
0 02 Micro InternationalLtd. v. Beyond

Innovation Technology Co.
0 Ortho-McNeilPharmaceuticals,Inc. v.
Mylan Laboratories,Inc.
- Rosco, Inc. v. MirrorLite Co.
- Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc.
- Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes
(U.S.A.)
0 TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Communications
Corp.
0 Transocean Offshore Deepwater
Drilling,Inc. v. GlobalSantaFeCorp.
0 Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc.
0 Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Services,
Inc.

Preliminary Injunction Denied
- Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten
. Docusign, Inc. v. Sertifi, Inc.
. Novartis Corp. v. Teva
PharmaceuticalsUSA, Inc.
• Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. HubbellInc.
• Sun Optics, Inc. v. FGX International,
Inc.
Permanent Injunction Denied
" Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten

"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"

FinisarCorp. v. DirecTV Group, Inc.
]MX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L. C.
KEG Technologies, Inc. v. Laimer
MercExchange,L.L.C v. eBay, Inc. (on
remand)
Praxair,Inc. v. A TM, Inc.
Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating
Ltd.
Voda v. Cordis Corp.
z4 Technologies, Inc v. Microsoft Corp.
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LITTLE FEDERAL CIRCUIT TREATMENT YET ON PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

The Federal Circuit has not dealt substantively with any permanent injunction
patent cases following eBay. The issue arose in AcumedL.L.C. v. Stryker Corp.3 4 In
that case, however, the Federal Circuit merely remanded the case to the district
court, noting that the Supreme Court struck down the Federal Circuit's general rule
and declining to make a judgment in the first instance as to whether a permanent
5
injunction should enter.3
That role belongs exclusively to the district court. Our task is solely to
review the district court's decisions for an abuse of discretion .... On
remand, the district court should reconsider the four-factor test as
propounded by the Supreme Court's decision in eBay as to whether or not
36
an injunction should issue.

IV.

IS THE PRESUMPTION OF IRREPARABLE HARM VIABLE?

One of the first issues taken up by district courts is whether any presumption of
irreparable harm remains after the Supreme Court ruling in eBay. District courts
seem to fall on both sides of this issue.

A. Federal Circuit CasesDo Not Establish the Point Either Way
The Federal Circuit cases are either ambiguous or silent on whether any
presumption survived eBay. In Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 37 the Federal Circuit vacated a preliminary injunction. 38 The district court
analysis occurred prior to the Supreme Court eBay ruling. On appeal, the majority
opinion (per Judge Prost, joined by Judge Gajarsa) mentioned the equitable questions
incident to granting an injunction. 39 The district court had "presumed Abbott would
suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction because of its conclusion regarding
likelihood of success on the merits." 40 The Federal Circuit noted that because Abbott
had not established a likelihood of success on the merits it was "no longer entitled to
41
a presumption of irreparable harm."
Hence the Federal Circuit did not exactly say that if Abbott had established
likely success on the merits, it would be entitled to a presumption of irreparable
harm, and we cannot say with certainty that the Federal Circuit adheres to the
irreparable harm presumption in the face of eBay, particularly when the majority
opinion in Abbott merely gave a different reason as to why the presumption no longer
34

483 F.3d 800 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

Id. at 811.
Id. at 811-12.
37 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
38 Id. at 1348.
3) Id.at 1347-48.
40 Id. at 1347.
41 Id. at 1348.
'35

36
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existed. The Federal Circuit went on to note that generic competition alone would
not establish that the patentee would suffer irreparable harm. 42 The majority
concluded that where a patentee does not show likely success on the merits and has
not clearly established that monetary damages would be insufficient, but that the
defendant also has not established that monetary damages are sufficient, the court
cannot say that the irreparable harm prong favors either party. 43 Additionally, the
Federal Circuit agreed with the district court in this case stating that absent other
relevant concerns, "the public is best served by enforcing patents that are likely valid
and infringed." 44 In this case, however, as Abbott did not establish likely success on
the merits, it concluded that the public interest was best served by denying the
preliminary injunction. 45 In conclusion, the court ruled that Abbott had not
established likely success on the merits, that without the presumption of irreparable
harm and in light of the arguable sufficiency of monetary damages, Abbott had not
established that irreparable harm supports the grant of the injunction, and that as a
substantial question of validity was raised by Teva, the public interest benefits from
denial of the injunction. 46 As to the third prong, balancing of the hardships, the
47
issue was uncontested and thus ruled in favor of granting the injunction.
Dissenting in Abbott, Judge Newman properly reminded the court that the
traditional principles announced in eBay "are no less applicable" in a preliminary
48
injunction situation, particularly when the purpose is to preserve status quo.
Further, the trial court's decision regarding a discretionary grant of a preliminary
injunction warrants great deference. Judge Newman was clearly troubled by the
49
lack of discussion of the trial judge's careful explanations.
The Federal Circuit affirmed entry of a preliminary injunction in SanofiSynthelabo v. Apotex, Inc. 50
The district court had applied a presumption of
irreparable harm following a conclusion of likely success on the merits. 51 However,
the court also found that the patentee had shown substantial evidence establishing
other forms of irreparable harm including irreversible price erosion, loss of good will,
potential layoffs, and the discontinuance of clinical trials. 52 The Federal Circuit
found that the appellant failed to show clear error by the district judge in deciding
this factor of irreparable harm and the other factors incident to a preliminary
injunction. 53 Interestingly, the Federal Circuit did not discuss eBay in this opinion.
Hence, the Federal Circuit has not spoken pointedly about whether the presumption
of irreparable harm survived eBay.

42

Id.

43 Id

4 Id.
45 Id.
46 _Td

47Id.
48

Id.at 1349 (Newman, J., dissenting).

49 Id
o0470 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
51 Jd.at

52 Id,
53Id.

1381.
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B. District Courts That No Longer Presume IrreparableHarm
Turning to district court cases, there are two camps. One camp holds that the
presumption was overruled or effectively overruled. The other does not. We discuss
the first camp first.
z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.54 was one of the first permanent
injunction patent cases decided after eBay. z4, a small software company, alleged
infringement of two patents that concern control over software activation. 55 The jury
found that Microsoft infringed willfully. 56 z4 sought a permanent injunction and
contended that the finding of infringement and validity raised a rebuttable
presumption of irreparable harm, and that the right to exclude also raised such a
presumption. 5' Judge Davis disagreed, stating:
This language [in eBay] does not imply a presumption, but places the
burden of proving irreparable injury on the plaintiff. Moreover, in eBay,
the Supreme Court warned against the application of categorical rules
when applying the traditional principles of equity ....
z4's suggestion, that
the right to exclude creates a presumption of irreparable harm, is not in line
with the Supreme Court's holding, which mandates that courts balance the
traditional principles of equity when considering the remedy of a permanent
injunction in patent cases. Accordingly, the Court does not apply a
58
presumption of irreparable harm.
The court went on to deny a permanent injunction and is discussed
59
substantively infra.
Second, other courts that have decided there is no presumption of irreparable
harm following eBay include:
60
* Paiee L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp. ;
61
* Voda v. Cordis Corp. ;
* IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L. C.62;
63
* ChamberlainGroup Inc. v. Lear Corp. ;
* Torspo Hockey International,Inc. v. Kor Hockey Ltd.64;

51 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006), affd, No. 2006-1638, 2007 WL 3407175 (Fed. Cir. Nov.

16, 2007).
55 Id. at 438.
56 Id.
57
58

Id. at 439.
Id. at 440.

5 See discussion infra Parts VI, VII.A.
60 No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), aftd in part,
vaeatedinpa±rt,Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631, 2007 WL 3024994 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).
61 No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006).
62 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 224 (D. Del. 2007) (quoting the "now-overturned presumption that a
patent holder is irreparably harmed upon a finding of infringement").
(33 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1843 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (eBay "has been read to limit the presumption of
irreparable harm solely upon the finding of infringement.").
(34 491 F. Supp. 2d 871, 881 (D. Minn. 2007) (stating that while eBay related to a permanent
injunction, the Supreme Court's "logic forbid courts to categorically presume irreparable harm in the
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* MereExchange,L.L.C v. eBay, Inc.65 ;
66
* Sun Optics, Inc. v. FGXInternational,Inc.

C. District Courts That May Still Presume IrreparableHarm
A second group of district courts have found that the presumption has survived
eBay. In ChristianaIndustries v. Empire Electronics, Inc.,6 7 a patent case granting
a preliminary injunction, the court declared that "irreparable harm is presumed
when a clear showing of patent validity and infringement has been made." 68 On
reconsideration, the court considered eBay and then reaffirmed the presumption of
irreparable harm, at least with respect to preliminary injunctions:
Plaintiff argues, and this Court agrees, that eBay did not invalidate
the presumption.
The eBay Court addressed the proper analysis for
permanent injunctive relief.
It held that courts err by categorically
granting permanent injunctive relief on a showing of infringement and
validity, without analyzing the traditional four factors for injunctive
relief.69
Other district courts that have reaffirmed the presumption of irreparable harm
or have not overturned it are generally preliminary injunction cases.
In Docusign, Inc. v. Sertif4 Inc.,70 the court noted the argument that no
presumption of harm is proper following eBay but relied on Abbott Laboratories v.
Andrx Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,7 1 a post-eBay Federal Circuit decision in which the
court "assumed (without deciding) that such a presumption was still appropriate in
the preliminary injunction context, where a strong showing of likely infringement
was made." 72 In this case, the facts were not strong enough for the court to presume
73
irreparable harm. The court denied a preliminary injunction.
In Novartis Corp. v. Teva PharmaceuticalsU.S.A., Inc.,74 the court, making no
citation to eBay, found that Novartis had not shown a strong showing of probable

preliminary-injunction context, even if a patentee has established that it will likely succeed on the
merits").
65 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 568 (E.D. Va. 2007) (stating that "such presumption no longer exists").
66 No. 07-137-SLR, 2007 WL 2228569, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2007) (stating that "even if the
moving party succeeds in demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits, the notion that there
follows a presumption of irreparable harm seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in

eBa/').
67443 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
68 Id. at 882 (quoting Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).
69Id. at 884.
70468 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
71 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
72 Doeusign, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 n.6.
73 Td. at 1311.
74Nos. 04-4473 (HAA)(ES), 06-1130 (HAA)(ES), 2007 WL 1695689 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007).
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infringement or reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and was, therefore, not
afforded the presumption of irreparable harm.l5
In Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell Inc.,7 6 the court applied a traditional
analysis, yet found neither a likelihood of success on the merits nor a likelihood of
irreparable harm even though the law presumes irreparable injury when a strong
77
showing of likelihood of success on the merits has been made.

V. CASES GRANTING PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

The majority of district courts that have been asked to enter a permanent
injunction following adjudications of infringement and validity have generally
granted injunctive relief. Most often, the parties competed directly, or the defendant
competed with a related company of the patent holder, and generally found
irreparable harm. In some other cases, courts have found injury to the reputation of
the patent holder or injury to ongoing research projects. The post eBay cases that
grant a permanent injunction are discussed below, taken up in chronologic order.

A. IrreparableHarm Found When PartiesCompete
Wald v. Mudhopper Oil Field Services, Ine.78 appears to be the first case after
eBay granting a permanent injunction. 79 After noting the eBay requirement that a
permanent injunction in patent infringement cases must be based on the same
analysis and considerations as in other cases, and that an injunction must comply
with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65, the court noted that the request for
the injunction was warranted in view of the facts of this case.80 The court cited lost
sales, the loss of market share and the opportunity to maintain their own product as
81
the industry standard, and damage to plaintiffs reputation for innovation.
Monetary damages do not take these items into account.8 2 Defendants failed to
identify any specific hardship they might suffer resulting from an injunction.8 3 In
defense, defendants noted that they had stopped sales of the accused product and
hence no injunction was necessary.8 4 The court rejected this argument on the basis
that defendants had made no indication that they had no inventory of the accused
products or the ability to obtain more. 8 5 The court did not discuss any public interest
86
aspect and granted the injunction.
7,Id.at *32.

76 No. 5:07-CV-0272, 2007 WL 2172648 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007).
77Id.at *8-10.
78 No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006).
79Id.at *5.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id
85 Id
8 Id.
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The next case granting a permanent injunction was Telequip Corp. v. Change
Exchange.8 7 Senior Judge Scullin entered a highly pro-exclusionary right ruling,
noting that even though the Supreme Court had rejected the "general rule" that
prevailing patent owners are entitled to a permanent injunction, courts had held
monetary damages inadequate as a remedy against future infringement because the
principal value of a patent resides in its statutory right to exclude. 88 Again, the
temporary cessation by defendant of infringing acts provided no defense against an
injunction, absent "very persuasive" evidence that defendant would not resume
infringement.8 9 The court noted that public interest would not be disserved because
without entering a permanent injunction, the right of a patentee to exclude infringers
would have only a fraction of the value it was intended to have and would no longer
be as great an incentive to engage in scientific and technological research. 90 Thus,
the plaintiff had satisfied the four-factor test and won a permanent injunction. 91
In TiVo Inc. v. Eehostar Comm umeations Corp.,92 the infringing products were
digital video recorders ("DVR"). 93 As to irreparable injury, the parties competed
94
directly, and the availability of infringing products led to a loss of market share.
Additionally, the timing of this loss was a key consideration: The market was in its
development (a "nascent market"), and once plaintiff lost customers to defendant, it
would not have the same opportunity to capture that market share after the market
matured. 95 The court referred to "sticky customers"-so that once a customer would
go in one direction instead of the other, he would tend to stay that way. 96 The
plaintiff was losing market share at a critical time in the market development. 97 The
market was being shaped to the plaintiffs disadvantage and resulted in long-term
customer loss.

98

In TiVo, the balance of hardships favored entry of a permanent injunction. 99
The marketing of directly-competitive products against those of a relatively new and
small company caused severe harm and "weighs heavily in favor of an injunction."1 00
While enjoining defendants will cause some harm, on balance defendants will suffer
less harm than the plaintiff, as the infringing products do not form the core of
Echostar's satellite transmission business and the injunction would not interfere
with its satellite transmissions. 101 Further, while there is a hardship in disabling

8 No. 5:01-CV-1748 (FJSGJD), 2006 WL 2385425, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006).
88 Id. at *2 (citing Honeywell Int'l, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 397 F. Supp. 2d 537,
546 (D. Del. 2005)).
89 Id.
90 Id. (citing Honeywell, 397 F. Supp. at 547).
91 Jd
92 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
9 Id. at 665.
94
95

Id. at 669-70.
Id.

9c Id. at 670.
97 Id. at 669.
98

Id. at 670.

9 Id
100 Id.
101

Id.
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the DVR capabilities of Echostar's DVR customers, that is a consequence of
Echostar's infringement and does not weigh against an injunction. 102
The TiVo district court declared that the public interest in maintaining a strong
patent system is served by enforcing an adequate remedy for infringement. 10 3 The
infringing products here are unrelated to any issue of public health or any other
equally key interest, and the public does not have a greater interest in allowing
104
Echostar's customers to continue using their infringing DVRs.
Floe International, Inc. v. Newmans' Manufacturing Inc.10 5 also entered a
permanent injunction. 10 6 While noting the four eBay factors, the court acknowledged
that defendant had stipulated to a permanent injunction, subject to a stay (to which
plaintiff had agreed) allowing defendant a reasonable time to sell off existing
inventory. 107
3M Innovative Properties Co. v. Avery Dennison Corp.10 8 revisited a permanent
injunction that the court had granted before eBay was decided. 10 9 Defendant
requested reconsideration of portions of the injunction order three days after the
Supreme Court eBay decision. 110 The court considered the eBay factors, to the extent
raised by defendant, and again granted 3M's motion for a permanent injunction.1
Surprisingly, the court found no need for a detailed analysis of irreparable harm,
stating merely that "[t]he Court will not disturb 3M's determination that its business
interests will not be served by the licensing of this product." 112 It cited district court
precedent from Minnesota in 1994 that in a patent infringement case, where the
infringing device will continue to infringe "and thus damage plaintiffs in the future,
monetary damages are generally considered to be inadequate."' 113 On these facts
alone, the court found that 3M had suffered irreparable injury and that monetary
damages were inadequate to compensate it for that injury.1 1 4 Regarding the
balancing of hardships, the district court focused on the important right to exclude,
stating that, notwithstanding the argument by Avery that "it would be severely
prejudiced by an injunction" by not being "able to restart operations or reacquire
customers," the patentee would suffer great harm if no injunction were entered
because it had been barred from enforcing its right to exclude the patent-in-suit for
more than 20% of the lifetime of the patent. 115 The court found this balance favoring
an injunction. 116 Finally, the court found a permanent injunction would not

102 Id.

Id.
Id.
105 No. 04-5120 (DWF/RLE), 2006 WL 2472112 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2006).
10c Id. at *9.
103

104

107

Id.

108

No. 01-1781 (JRT/FLN), 2006 WL 2735499 (D. Minn. Sept. 25, 2006).

109 Id. at *2.

110 Id. at *1.
III Id.
112

Id.

113

Id. (citing Schneider (Europe) AG v. Scimed Life Sys., Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813, 861 (D. Minn.

1994)).
114

Id.

115 Id. at *2.
116

Id.
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disservice the public interest. 117 The case concerned commercial graphics used for
advertising, so there were no concerns about public health or safety that could
warrant a denial of injunctive relief. Finally, the court refused to allow defendant
any time to dispose of inventory and ruled that "Avery must negotiate the sale of this
118
inventory with 3M."
A Tennessee court entered a permanent injunction in Smith & Nephew, Inc. v.
Synthes (U.S.A.).119 After citing eBay, the district court ruled that irreparable harm
can occur when money alone cannot adequately atone for the injury, such as when
the patentee loses market share or its reputation for innovation. 120 The court noted
direct competition between the two parties regarding the patented and infringing
products. 121 The infringement had a direct negative impact on sales of plaintiff and,
according to the court, the competition was shown at trial to reduce plaintiffs ability
to create customer relationships. 122 Further, the loss of sales due to the competition
not only harms plaintiff monetarily but inhibits the plaintiffs ability to develop new
products. 123 It interferes with relationships plaintiff is able to form with surgeons. 124
Thus, the court found that lost market share, lost profits, and loss of brand name
recognition caused by defendant's continued sale of infringing products are
irreparable injuries. 125 The court noted that even though plaintiff was willing to
license its patent, that alone is not sufficient to negate irreparable harm. 126 These
same facts also establish the inadequacy of remedies at law: competition in the
marketplace, damage to plaintiffs good will, and brand name recognition indicated to
the court that defendant's violation of the right to exclude could not be compensated
127
adequately through money damages.
Interestingly, the court noted that even if money damages were provable for
some components of the damage, that is not enough by itself to negate an equitable
remedy. 128 The money damages must be "plain and adequate" or as practical and
efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration as the equitable
remedy. 129 The court focused on the right to exclude and offered a broad statement
that money damages "generally are not an adequate remedy against future
infringement because the central value of holding a patent is the right to exclude
13 0
others from using the patented product."
The court next held that the balance of hardships favored plaintiff and the mere
hardship on defendant incurred in the process of ceasing operations was

H7 Id.
Id.
119 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 985 (W.D. Tenn. 2006).
118

120 Id. at 981 (citing Wald v. Mudhopper Oilfield Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL
2128851, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006)).
121 Id.at 983.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.

125

Id.

126
127

Id.
Id. at 983-84.

128

Id. at 984.

Id.
1301d. (citing Telequip Corp. v. Change Exchange, No. 5:01-CV-1748 (FJS/GJD), 2006 WL
129

2385425, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2006)).
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insufficient. 131 Further, any effort, time, and expense in redesigning its product,
while perhaps significant, is the consequence of patent infringement. 132 T he court
further ruled that there was no hardship on physicians or patients because other
competing products were in the marketplace. 133 Similarly, the court found the public
interest was not offended by an injunction because the permanent injunction would
advance "consumer access to more competitive, and thus, presumably better,
products by allowing Smith & Nephew the benefit of its patents and the ability to
gain greater brand recognition." 134 Concluding, the court noted that plaintiff had
demonstrated irreparable harm, which could not be remedied through money
damages. 135 It characterized the balance of hardships and public interest impact as
"speculative" but weighing in favor of plaintiff and thus granted the injunction. 136
Rosco, Inc. v. Mrrur Lite Co. 137 involved a claim of patent infringement by
plaintiff Rosco against defendant Mirror Lite and a counterclaim for patent
infringement by Mirror Lite against Rosco. 138 The district court received the case on
remand for determination of an infringement issue. 139 After noting the eBay
requirements, the court cited the well known proposition that an accused infringer's
assertion that it has ceased production of the infringing product is not by itself
sufficient reason to deny a permanent injunction. 140
The court rejected Rosco's equitable defense that Mirror Lite had approached
employees of a customer of Rosco and informed them that Mirror Lite had won the
case, that "Rosco is locked out from the cross-view mirror business," that the
customer would no longer be able to buy any Rosco oval cross-view mirrors, and that
Rosco's supply agreement with the customer for oval mirrors would be null and
void. 141 In response to Rosco's defense, the district court distinguished Second
Circuit precedent concerning equitable remedies. 142
One of those precedents
indicated that a permanent injunction is "not intended as a club to be wielded by a
patentee to enhance his negotiating stance," nor should an injunction issue when the
only real advantage to a plaintiff is to strengthen its position. 143 The facts of those
earlier cases were different, however.
The district court provided negligible discussion of how the four factors applied
to this case. It said nothing about irreparable harm. As to balancing the harms, it
stated merely that a permanent injunction "would not disproportionately burden
Rosco." 144 It said nothing about the adequacy of legal remedies or the public interest,
but it reported that to the extent the public is interested in purchasing the patented
mirrors or riding on buses equipped with such mirrors, those mirrors could be
131

Id.

1:32
Id.
133

Id. at 985.

134

Id.

1:35Id.
136 Id.
137

No. CV-96-5658, 2006 WL 2844400 (E.D.N.Y.Sept. 29, 2006).

138
139
140

Id. at *1.

141

Id.

142
143
144

Id. at *4-5.

Id.

Id. at *4.
Id. at *4 (citations omitted).

Id. at *5.
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obtained from Mirror Lite.1 45 As to the equitable defense, it stated that even if the
contentions were true, Mirror Lite's "efforts at self-help are not so egregious as to
forfeit its right to the legal protections of an injunction."' 146 Thus, it appears that the
court here (Senior District Judge Sifton) was accustomed to the pre-eBay rule that a
prevailing patentee has a right to an injunction.
In Illinois, the court in Black & Decker Inc. v. Robert Bosch Too] Corp.14 7 found
irreparable harm and entered an injunction against a discontinued product line of
the defendant. 148 District Judge St. Eve refused to extend the injunction to the
current product line because that was the subject of a current lawsuit before a
different judge. 149 As to irreparable harm, the provision in the patent statute of
injunctive relief, which she deemed the principal value of a patent, weighs against a
holding that monetary damages will always be sufficient to make the patentee
whole. 150 The court rejected the defendant's contention that because it had stopped
making the accused product a year ago, there could be no irreparable harm. 151 The
court ruled, however, that such an explanation by itself is not enough of a reason to
deny a permanent injunction and that the defendant must offer "persuasive evidence
that further infringement [would] not take place." 152 In this case, some of the old
products were found available for sale on Amazon.com. 153 Accordingly, the patentee
154
had set forth evidence that "future infringement ... might take place."
Additionally, the court found harm to the plaintiffs reputation and loss of market
share. 155 It ruled these harms were not compensable by money damages. 156
Considering the balancing of hardships, this is not a case where defendant
Bosch would be driven out of business by an injunction because, as defendant admits,
it stopped making these infringing products over one year ago and was presently
157
making a different product accused of infringement but not yet litigated.
The district court found that the public interest favored enforcement of patent
rights against a willful infringer. 158 The public interest is not disserved by a
permanent injunction because it "provides [the patent owner] with an adequate
remedy and allows it to enforce its patent rights." 159 Thus, all of the factors favored
the patentee, and Judge St. Eve granted the motion for a permanent injunction. 160
Judge Ward in Marshall, Texas entered a permanent injunction in Visto Corp. v.
Seven Networks, Inc., 161 a case involving mobile email systems and methods. Judge
145
H6

Id. at *4.

147

Id.
No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3446144 (N.D. I1. Nov. 29, 2006).

148

Id. at *6.

1'9
Id.at *6.
150 Id.at *3(citing Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
151 Id.at *4.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155

Id.

15(

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id. at *5.

159 Id. at *6.
1(;0
Id.

161
No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 WL 3741891 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006).
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Ward noted the eBay requirements and then discussed them individually. He found
that the direct competition between the parties weighs heavily in the analysis and
cited the opinion from his colleague on the bench, Judge Folsom in TiVo Inc. v.
EchoStar Communications Corp.,162 finding irreparable harm "because 'the
availability of infringing products leads to a loss of market share."' 163 Judge Ward
rejected the argument that Research in Motion (a defendant) had a large market
share and found that Visto would suffer irreparable injury. 164 Judge Ward also
found that notwithstanding a large damage award for past injury, any future
damages could only compensate Visto for an approximate loss, wherefore damages
are not a suitable proxy for injunctive relief.1 65 Here, legal remedies were inadequate
166
because of the "inability to calculate the plaintiffs future losses with precision."
Similarly, the court balanced hardships in favor of plaintiff, finding that absent an
injunction, Vista would "lose goodwill, potential revenue, and the very right to
exclude that is the essence of the intellectual property at issue." 167 While defendant
will be harmed by the injunction, the balance of hardships favors plaintiff.168
Finally, the court found no persuasive showing that the public interest would be
disserved by an injunction and, to the contrary, the public interest would be served
by issuing an injunction "to protect the patent rights at issue."1 69 Hence, the court
weighed the traditional equitable factors and found in favor of the patent owner. 170
A permanent injunction was granted in Transocean Offshore Deep Water
Drilling,Inc. v. GlobalSantaFeCorp.171 The court found infringement of apparatus
claims but not method claims in the patents-in-suit on summary judgment, and a
jury rejected all defenses. 172 The Texas court ruled that the patentee was being
irreparably harmed because its competitor, GSF (the defendant), "will be able to
continue using the patented invention to compete against the patent holder,
173
Transocean, for business in a competing market with a small customer base."
The district court found legal remedies inadequate and distinguished Justice
Kennedy's comments dealing with a patented invention being only a small
component of the product. 174 That did not correspond to the facts of this case where
the infringing components were "structures that are related to the rigs' core
functionality." 175 The court decided that a compulsory license forced on Transocean
would not contain "any of the commercial business terms typically used by a patent
176
holder to control its technology or to limit encroachment on its market share."

446 F. Supp. 2d 664, (E.D. Tex. 2006).
Visto Corp., 2006 WL 3741891, at *4 (quoting TiVo, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 669).
1M Id.

162
163

1i5 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168

Id.

169 Id. at *5.
170 Id.

171 No. H-03-2910, 2006 WL 3813778 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006).
172 Id. at *4.
173

Id.

174 Id. at *5.
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Accordingly, even though Transocean was willing to consider licensing the patentsin-suit, the court ruled that legal remedies were inadequate."'7
The patentees' inability to replace products (oil drilling rigs) did not tip the
17 8
balance of hardships in favor of defendant in Transocean.
The court did find that
there would be significant hardship on defendant GSF if it were enjoined from using
its drilling rigs, which were currently under contract for rates of between $200,000
and $500,000 daily.17 9 On the other hand, without an injunction, the patentee
Transocean would likely suffer irreparable injury by any future infringement and
noted that GSF has no right to continue infringing and that in any event a senior
officer of GSF had testified that it could structurally modify its drill rigs to avoid
infringement with minimum disruption. 180 The court thus concluded that the harm
to the patent holder outweighed the harm of an injunction of limited scope to the
infringer. 181
A significant public interest factor was minimized in Transoeean.182 Defendant
argued that enjoining GSF from using its drill rigs, already in place with lessees,
would delay the first oil production from certain fields and negatively affect the
public interest. 183 The court rejected this and noted that public policy favors the
enforcement of patent rights and that, in any event, the delay in production and
disservice to the public that an injunction might cause can be mitigated by
appropriately limiting the scope of the injunction. 184 Hence, the court found that this
factor weighs in favor of entering the injunction. 185
The court in MPT, Inc. v. Marathon Lahels, Inc.18 6 also granted a permanent
injunction.187 The court found irreparable harm because the plaintiff "obtained
patents that allowed [it and its closely related company] to gain a dominant position
in the sale of placards for use in the patented method."18 8 The patents were not an
"insubstantial component of a larger invention," and the patent read directly on the
use of defendant Marathon's placard to practice the method. 189 Thus, "MPT invented
a method, actively created a market, and established a strong market position and
customer good will.
Usurping this market by inducing or contributing to
infringement will irreparably harm MPT."190 The court weighed the other factors
similarly in favor of the injunction. 191 Monetary damages were inadequate to
compensate for the injury, as royalties "will not stop the erosion of [the] market.
Another market entrant is likely to lead to a drop in prices.
...
192 The balance of
177 Id.
178 Id.at
179 Id. at

*6-7.
*7.

18oId.
181 Id.
182

Id.

183

Id.

184

Id.

185 Id.

189

1:04-CV-2357, 2007 WL 184747 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2007).
Id.at *1.
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hardships weighed in favor of the patentee because the defendant had other business
and some of the business involving the patented invention occurred outside the
United States. 193 Hence, "only a small percentage of [defendant's] total sales [would]
be prohibited by an injunction." 194 On the public interest factor, the court cited the
general public interest favoring strong patent protection and that the public interest
supports an injunction except in cases where there is a public health and safety
195
issue.
Novozymes A/S v. Geneneor International, Inc.196 awarded a permanent
injunction in a case relating to enzymes used in producing ethanol fuel.1 97 The
patent owner was a Danish corporation with its principal place of business in
Denmark. 198 Its United States subsidiary NZNA tried unsuccessfully to join the suit
as a plaintiff. 199 Circuit Judge Jordan, sitting by designation, found irreparable
harm due to the infringement and rejected defendant's argument on the meaning of
eBay.200 Thus, the court stated: "Contrary to Genencor's argument ... the Supreme
Court in eBay did not state that loss of the right to exclude could not be irreparable
harm. Rather, the Court simply rejected the proposition that the patentee's right to
' 20 1
exclude should always lead to injunctive relief for patent infringement."
The court noted that the patentee licensed the patents-in-suit to its U.S.
subsidiary in exchange for a royalty and expected the value of the subsidiary to
20 2
increase in accordance with the successful marketing of the licensed technology.
The growth of the subsidiary depended on the right to exclude provided by the
patents, and even though the patentee did not itself market the enzymes, "it has
suffered harm beyond the reasonable royalty that it can recover from Defendants.
And Novozymes will continue to suffer such irreparable harm if Defendants are not
20 3
enjoined from infringing on Novozymes' right to exclude."
With regard to the adequacy of legal relief, the Novozymes court found that the
remedy of lost profits was unavailable because the patentee marketed its technology
by licensing it to its own subsidiary. 20 4 In addition, even if the case were otherwise,
the statutory right to exclude is a benefit that cannot be equated to a cash award in
the case of direct competitors. 20 5 The patentee "has a right, granted by Congress, not
' 20 6
to assist its rival with the use of proprietary technology."
The Novozymes court found that the balance of hardships favored the patentee,
which "would suffer irreparable harm from future infringement."' 20 7 On the other
19:3d.
194

Id.

195 Id.

196 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007).
197 Id. at 595.
198

Id.

199 Id. at 603-04. The court concluded that NZNA was a nonexclusive licensee, thus, it had no
right to enforce the patent against an accused infringer and no standing to sue the defendant. Id.
200 Id. at 612.
201 Id. (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct 1837, 1840 (2006)).
202 Id.
2 3 Id.
204 Id. at 613.
2 5 Id.
2 0 Id.
207

Id.
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hand, the defendants had apparently removed the infringing product from the
market and thus would not be harmed by a permanent injunction. 208 Similarly,
there was no evidence that a permanent injunction would harm the public.

20 9

Though the fuel ethanol industry was gaining importance, Novozymes had a
210
competing product, and the defendant had products that did not infringe.
In Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical,Inc. v. Mylan LaboratoriesInc.,211 the Court
entered a permanent injunction in a Hatch-Waxman Act case. 2 12

There was no

dispute over the equitable considerations, as the court had already granted a
preliminary injunction and defendant conceded that based on the court's prior
findings, plaintiff was entitled to a permanent injunction. 213 In granting the
injunction, the court agreed with an argument by Ortho that under the Hatch214
Waxman Act, the effective date of approval of the drug had to be reset.
Judge Ward entered a permanent injunction in 02 Micro InternationalLtd. v.
Beyond Innovation Technology Co.2 15 After noting the Supreme Court requirements
from eBay, Judge Ward addressed the four factors individually, concluding that 02
had demonstrated irreparable injury. 216 The parties competed directly, which
"weighs heavily" in the analysis. 2 17 Accordingly, the court declared that 02 Micro
would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction. 218 The court also found that
02 Micro had demonstrated that legal remedies were inadequate. 219 It did not seek
monetary remedies for past infringement because such remedies would not
adequately compensate it.220 Further, the defendants were foreign corporations and
there was "little assurance that [02] could collect monetary damages."2 2 1 Regarding
the relative hardships, the court agreed that without an injunction, 02 would
"continue to suffer irreparable injury to its business, future opportunities and
general reputation."2 2 2 Moreover, a president of one of the defendant companies had
indicated that an injunction would have an insubstantial impact on the company's
entire business.22 3 The court found "no persuasive showing that the public interest
would be disserved by an injunction," but to the contrary, would be served by
22 4
protecting the patent right with an injunction.

A permanent injunction was entered in a Florida case, 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex
Securities, Ltd.225 Chief District Judge Fawsett noted the eBay ruling and stated
208 Id.
20 9 Id.
210

d.

No. 04-1689, 2007 WL 869545 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2007).
212 Id. at *1.
211

213
214
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Id. at *2.

215 No. 204CV32, 2007 WL 869576 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007).
216

Id. at *2.

217

Id.

218

Id.

219

Id.

220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
22 3 Id.
224
225

Id. at *3.
No. 6:02-CV-1354-Orl-28DAB, 2007 WL 1101238 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007).
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that "[tihe standard for a permanent injunction is essentially the same as for a
preliminary injunction except that the plaintiff must show actual success instead of
likely success." 226 In granting the permanent injunction, the district court rejected

the contention that plaintiffs delay in filing the case provided a basis for rejecting
equitable relief. 227 The court noted that there were many cases where this factor was

raised in the context of a prelimina-ry injunction but found just one opinion
considering delay as a factor in a motion for a permanent injunction. 228 The court
noted that to the extent defendant was raising delay as barring the claims from the
229
equitable doctrine of laches, this argument was deemed waived.

The Florida court explained that on a request for a permanent injunction, the
relief usually turned on the unavailability of an adequate remedy at law and that
irreparable injury isone basis for showing such inadequacy. 230 The court ruled that
in the present case, plaintiff had "established the merits of its claim, and its past
conduct does little, if anything, to inform the question of whether [plaintiff] will be
harmed" in the future by infringing acts. 23 1 The court found irreparable harm in that

the parties were competitors and a competitor is granted the right by Congress not to
be forced to assist its rivals in the use of proprietary technology. 232 Additionally, the
court saw a loss of market position and good will as factors showing irreparable
harm. 233 The court understood irreparable harm as intended to "serve as a measure

234
of the quality or severity of harm [needed] to trigger equitable intervention."
In contrast, the question of the adequacy of legal remedies concerns the
"possibility of alternative [types] of relief, [without regard to] the seriousness of the

injury." 235 The court found that allowing an infringer to continue to offer infringing

services in direct competition with the patent holder "would be inequitable." 236 The
court's discussion of balancing hardships noted that providing the services at issue
was a relatively small part of defendant's business, even though it served a much
larger portion of the specific market than plaintiff.237 It ruled that "a properly
circumscribed injunction would permit the [defendants] to continue as an on-going
business concern while protecting the interests of 800 Adept." 238

The court found

that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction and to the
contrary the public has an interest in maintaining a strong patent system. 239 The
court found no issue of public health or other critical public interest.240

226

*5 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n. 12 (1987)).

227
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The Southern District of Texas also entered a permanent injunction in MGM
Well Services, Inc. v. Mega Lift Systems, L.L. C.241 In weighing the four factors, the
Texas court noted that plaintiff MGM demonstrated irreparable harm absent an
injunction. 242 MGM has an existing policy of not licensing its patented technology,
and defendant and its principal had shown a proclivity for marketing infringing
products even after a preliminary injunction had been entered. 243 The court deemed
the continued loss of exclusive rights and the unwillingness of plaintiff to grant a
license to constitute irreparable injury. 244 The irreparable injury factor weighed
heavily in the balancing of hardships also. 245

Finally, there was no evident public

interest to be disserved by entering a permanent injunction and, to the contrary, the
public interest is best served, according to the court, by protecting patent rights "and
246
enforcing the applicable laws."

Judge Ward entered a permanent injunction also in Brooktrout Inc. v. Eieon
Networks Corp.247 Here, the court considered the eBay factors and reinstated a
permanent injunction it had previously entered on January 30, 2006.248 It noted

irreparable injury when a patent "is asserted against a competitor in the plaintiffs
market." 249 Here, the court found that infringing acts of inducement will lead to a
loss of Brooktrout's market share. 250 Regarding the inadequacy of legal remedies,
the court ruled that plaintiff had met its burden here also. 251 Notwithstanding a jury

award of damages, those legal remedies compensate only for past injury. 252 A threat
of continued infringement exists, and the nature of infringement (via inducement)
makes it difficult to determine future damages. 253 Again, while future damages
might compensate for approximate loss, that does not make future damages adequate
as a proxy for injunctive relief, and the inability to calculate future loss with
reasonable precision makes legal remedies inadequate. 254 The court saw the
balancing of hardships tipping in favor of plaintiff in that defendant was free to
continue to sell a different product, while without an injunction plaintiff would lose
good will, potential revenue, and its right to exclude, which is the very essence of the
intellectual property right. 255 The court found that the public interest would be
256
served by issuing an injunction to protect patent rights.
Finally, the Southern District of New York deemed a permanent injunction
appropriate in Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Ine.257 The court noted the eBay factors
241 No.

H-05-1634, 2007 WL 1231682 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2007).
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and concluded that irreparable harm and an inadequacy of legal remedies supported
the issuance of an injunction. 258 "Sanofi showed that it [was] likely to suffer
irreparable price erosion, loss of good will, and a negative impact on the amount of
research devoted to developing other medical uses for [its drug]."259

Regarding the

balancing of hardships, the court adhered to its analysis in its earlier preliminary
injunction decision in this case and found that the balance of hardships favored a
permanent injunction. 260 On the public interest factor, the court noted that this case
concerns generic drugs at reduced prices. 26 1 Here, there were competing important
262
public interests that were roughly balanced or slightly favored the patentee.
Weighing all four factors, the court concluded that a permanent injunction was
263
appropriate.

B. Other IrreparableHarms-InjunctionsGranted
A permanent injunction was awarded also in Commonwealth Scientific and
Industrial Research Organisation v. Buffalo Technology Inc.264

This case was

decided by Judge Davis, who had earlier ruled that no permanent injunction should
be entered in z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.265

In this case, plaintiff

Commonwealth Industrial Research Organisation ("CSIRO") was the main scientific
research organ of the Australian federal government. 266 "One of CSIRO's broad goals
[was] to develop technology to create start-up companies and/or be licensed to firms
to earn commercial royalties to fund other research." 267 CSIRO's invention was
incorporated into an Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineer ("IEEE")
standard, subject to the condition that a license could be obtained on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. 268
When CSIRO contacted companies practicing the
patent, none of them accepted its license offer. 269 CSIRO prevailed on summary
judgment of validity and infringement. 270
In analyzing the permanent injunction motion, although defendant pointed out
that it did not compete with the patentee, the court noted the warning in eBay
against creating broad classifications. 27 1 In fact, the Supreme Court had referred
specifically to university researchers who might reasonably prefer to license their
patents, and there was no basis for categorically denying them a permanent

258 Id. at
259 Id.
260 Id.

2(1

397.

Id.

2(2 Id.
23 3 Id.

2(4 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
2(65434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006), affd, No. 2006-1638, 2007 WL 3407175 (Fed. Cir. Nov.

16, 2007).
266 Commonwealth Scientific, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 601.
2(;7

Id.

268 Id. at
2(9 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at

602.
603-04.
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injunction. 272 The district court found that the royalties received by CSIRO were
used to fund numerous research projects in important R&D areas such as addressing
obesity, type 2 diabetes, developing biomaterials to aid the body in recovering from
traumatic damage, and the impact of climate change. 273 The court said this was not
merely a financial harm because CSIRO competes internationally with other
research groups such as other universities for resources, ideas and scientific
minds. 274 Delays in funding result in lost research capabilities and oftentimes once

the opportunities have passed, they are permanently lost, as another entity takes
advantage of the opportunity. 275 The harm of lost opportunities is irreparable and
cannot be regained with future money because the opportunity that was lost in the
276
past belongs to someone else now.

Judge Davis also found that money damages were inadequate to compensate
CSIRO, for its damages were not merely financial. 277 Even though a violation of the
right to exclude does not per se mean that the patent holder cannot be compensated
adequately by money damages, Judge Davis acknowledged that money damages
would be inadequate under various circumstances. 278
This includes when the
infringer saturates the market for the invention, damages the patent holder's good
will or brand name recognition, or violates the exclusionary right in a way that
cannot be compensated through money damages. 279 Here, while those do not apply
in particular, the harm to CSIRO includes harm to its reputation as a research
institution. 280 This is similar to the harm to a company's brand recognition or good
will.281 Additionally, this case is unlike one situation contemplated by Justice
Kennedy in his concurring opinion in eBay because the infringement here is not
limited to a minor component of the technology but rather the core technology
embedded in the IEEE standard. 28 2 "A compulsory license [would] not adequately
compensate CSIRO." 283 The district court also noted that a royalty payment does not

necessarily include the non-monetary license terms that are important to a licensor
2
such as CSIRO. 84

With regard to the balance of hardships, the court discounted any hardship on
defendant for ceasing infringing operations because those who elect to build a
business on a product found to infringe cannot be heard to complain if an injunction
against continuing infringement destroys the business. 28 5
Moreover, wireless
products made up only 11% of defendant's business. 28 6 Defendant faced only
monetary harm in the event the injunction issued, but the patentee faced other types
272

Id. at 604

273

Id.

274Id.
275

Id.

276

Id.

277Id.at
278

606.
Id. at 605.

279

Id.

280
281
282
283

Id.
Id.
Id. at 606.
Id.

284 Id.
285

Id. (citing Windsurfing Int'l Inc. v. AMF Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 1003 n.12 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).

286

Id.
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of harm absent an injunction. 28 7 Those other harms would negatively and directly
impact further research and development efforts and the ability to bring new
technologies to fruition. 288 The court weighed these factors in favor of the permanent
28 9
injunction.
Interestingly, the court approached the public interest factor from a pro-patent
standing. Thus, the court referred to the public interest in a strong patent system
and an interest in protecting the rights of patent holders and enforcing adequate
remedies for infringement. 290 The court noted that "courts have consistently allowed
injunctive relief to patent owners whose patents have been infringed," citing 1989
and earlier Federal Circuit cases. 291 The court noted that this was not one of the
"rare and limited circumstances where an injunction would be contrary to significant
public interest such as health and safety concerns." 292 Moreover, the products here
(wireless local area networks) were obtainable from multiple sources other than
defendant.293 In conclusion, the court found that a permanent injunction should
294
issue under the traditional four-factor test recited in eBay.

C. Other Bases for GrantingPermanentInjunctions
Allan Block Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co. 295 is unusual in that the court granted a
296
permanent injunction without explaining why there would be irreparable harm.
Indeed, after noting the Supreme Court ruling in eBay, the district court appears not
to have given any explanation whatsoever for entering injunctive relief, apparently
basing this order on the fact that the jury found infringement.
The jury determined that Dillon's manufacture or sale of Allan Block blocks
after July 27, 2004, infringed Allan Block's Patents. That determination
stands. After considering the relevant factors, the Court grants Allan
Block's motion for a permanent injunction prohibiting infringement of the
'010 and '236 patents through the future manufacture or sale of Allan Block
blocks. In short, Allan Block will be irreparably harmed if Dillon is not
enjoined from manufacturing or selling Allan Block blocks, monetary
damages are inadequate to compensate for any continued infringement, and
the balance of the harms and public interest favor issuance of an injunction.
The Court, however, does not enjoin Dillon from selling its remaining
inventory of Allan Block blocks. The record indicates that the jury's
damage award included a reasonable royalty for all Allan Block blocks

287

Id.

288

Id.

289

Id.at 606-08.
Id. at 607.

290

291 Id.at 607 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
In re Berwyn E. Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

292
293

Id.

294

Id. at 608.

Id.

295

509 F. Supp. 2d 795 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2007).

296

Id.at 811-12.
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remaining in Dillon's inventory. It would be inequitable to prohibit Dillon
from selling the blocks for which it must pay royalties.29
In this case, the patentee apparently did not compete with the defendant but
instead was merely a developer and licensor of technology:
Allan Block is a Minnesota corporation involved in the development
and licensing of a cement block and related technology used in the
construction of segmental retaining walls. Allan Block owns United States
Patent Nos. 4,909,010 ('010 Patent) and 5,484,236 ('236 Patent), titled
"Concrete Block for Retaining Walls" and "Method of Forming Concrete
Retaining Wall Block," respectively. In 1991, Allan Block and Dillon
entered into a Production Agreement (Agreement) that allowed Dillon to
manufacture and sell Allan Block blocks in return for royalty payments.
During the course of the Agreement, Dillon developed a new block called the
StoneLoc block. 298

Note that the injunction here allowed the defendant to sell existing inventory
because the jury award had apparently included that inventory in its royalty
calculations.

VI. CASES DENYING PERMANENT INJUNCTIONS

As noted in the table supra,299 permanent injunctions are not always awarded.
It is important to understand the reasons why various district courts have denied
permanent injunctions. They consider the four factors and generally find no
irreparable harm, that remedies at law are sufficient, and that the balance of
hardships and the public interest factors favor the infringer. The usual reason for
denying the injunction is an absence of competition between the parties and no harm
to goodwill, market share, or the like. Not every trial court finds in favor of the
patentee on the issue of irreparable harm.
KEG Technologies, Inc. v. Laima 300 appears to be the first district court patent
30 1
case to consider permanent injunctions after the Supreme Court's eBay decision.
The court ruled that injunctive relief was not foreclosed merely because infringement
Id. at 811.
at 799.
299 See supraPart II.
297

298 Id.

'300 436 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
301 Id. at 1371.
This decision is discussed infra under "Alternatives Being Used by Courts"
because the Supreme Court's eBayruling was announced on the same day as an evidentiary hearing
following a default in the present case. See infra Part VII. Additionally, there seems to be several
misstatements in the decision as reported. For example, though the court discussed the factors from
eBy in determining whether there should be any permanent injunction against patent
infringement, at the outset the court indicated that injunctive relief was sought only under the
Georgia Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. KEG Teebs., 436 F. Supp. 2d at 1367. It then said
the court was asked to award damages only on the claims for patent infringement.
Id.
Nevertheless, the court turned to the question of injunctions under the patent statute. Id. at 1371.
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was established through a default judgment.30 2 The court also ruled that its prior
303
denial of preliminary injunctive relief would not foreclose a permanent injunction.
The court noted that an evidentiary hearing occurred on the same date as the
Supreme Court opinion in eBay,30 4 that the evidence of record adequately
demonstrated irreparable harm, and that there would be no disservice to the public
interest. 30 5 However, it said that plaintiff did not show and had little notice, if any,
that it needed to show that it was charged with the duty of proving the inadequacy of
monetary relief and the balancing of hardships tips in its favor, since the prior
Federal Circuit rule had mandated an injunction in all but the most extraordinary
cases. 3 0 6 Accordingly, the court decided not to deny the motion for injunctive relief
but allowed plaintiff the opportunity to take additional evidence and argument on
the availability of injunctive relief or other equitable alternatives.3 0° 7 Hence, though
the court may have denied equitable relief at this time, it clearly did not foreclose a
permanent injunction. 308
In z4 Technologies, Ine. v. Mierosoft Corp.,30 9 Judge Davis declined to enjoin
Microsoft and flatly rejected contentions that z4 would suffer irreparable harm
absent an injunction.3 10 The court ruled that the (small) patent owner was not losing
sales, not losing brand name recognition, and not losing market share due to
differences between the way Microsoft sells its products compared to how plaintiff z4
sells its patented product:
There is no logical reason that a potential consumer or licensee of z4's
technology would have been dissuaded from purchasing or licensing z4's
product activation technology for use in its own software due to Microsoft's
infringement.
Similarly, Microsoft's continued infringement does not
inhibit z4's ability to market, sell, or license its patented technology to other
entities in the market. Microsoft does not produce product activation
software that it then individually sells, distributes, or licenses to other
software manufacturers or consumers. If it did, then z4 might suffer
irreparable harm in that Microsoft would be excluding z4 from selling or
licensing its technology to those software manufacturers or consumers.
However, Microsoft only uses the infringing technology as a small
component of its own software, and it is not likely that any consumer of
Microsoft's Windows or Office software purchases these products for their
product activation functionality.
In the absence of a permanent injunction against Microsoft, z4 will not
suffer lost profits, the loss of brand name recognition or the loss of market
302 KEG

Teehs., 436 F. Supp. 2d at 1367.

303 Id.
304 Id.
305Id.
307

Id.

308

See id.

309 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006), affd, No. 2006-1638, 2007 WL 3407175 (Fed. Cir. Nov.

16, 2007).
310 Id. at 442-43.
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share because of Microsoft's continued sale of the infringing products.
These are the type of injuries that are often incalculable and irreparable.
The only entity z4 is possibly prevented from marketing, selling or licensing
its technology to absent an injunction is Microsoft. As discussed in the next
section, z4 can be compensated for any harm it suffers in the way of future
infringement at the hands of Microsoft by calculating a reasonable royalty
for Microsoft's continued use of the product activation technology.
Accordingly, z4 has not demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm
absent a permanent injunction.311
Thus, one important factor here was that Microsoft was not selling the
activation software in competition with the patent owner. 312 On the adequacy of
legal remedies, Judge Davis explained that there couldbe a situation where remedies
at law would be inadequate, but that was not true in this case because here, it is
possible to calculate damages with reasonable certainty:
The violation of a patent owner's right to exclude can present a
situation where monetary damages cannot adequately compensate the
patent holder for that injury. For example, when an infringer saturates the
market for a patented invention with an infringing product or damages the
patent holder's good will or brand name recognition by selling infringing
products that infringer violates the patent holder's exclusionary right in a
manner that cannot be compensated through monetary damages. This is
because it is impossible to determine the portions of the market the patent
owner would have secured but for the infringer or how much damage was
done to the patent owner's brand recognition or good will due to the
infringement. However, this is not the scenario in the present case.
Microsoft's use of z4's intellectual property does not exclude z4 from selling
or licensing its product to any sector of the market or threaten z4's brand
name recognition or good will in any way. z4 is only excluded from selling
or licensing its technology to Microsoft. Accordingly, z4 is not excluded from
the use of its intellectual property in a way that cannot be calculated with
reasonable certainty in the form of monetary damages, just as the past
313
damages for infringement were calculated at trial.
Regarding the balancing of hardships, Microsoft persuaded the district court
that a permanent injunction would work a serious hardship on the company (e.g., it
would require enormous resources, would affect 450 separate variations in thirtyseven different languages, would delay future releases, and would invite pirated
software, etc.) that far outweighed any hardship on the prevailing plaintiff:
Although the arguments presented by Microsoft may be hypothetical, the
scenarios Microsoft describes are not out of the realm of possibility and are
in some instances quite likely. Importantly, the potential hardships
311

Icat 440-41.
Id at 440.
313 Id. at 441.
312
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Microsoft could suffer if the injunction were granted outweigh any limited
and reparable hardships that z4 would suffer in the absence of an
314
injunction.
Also, Microsoft persuaded the district court that turning off a feature in its
operating system and in its OFFICE software was against the public interest:
Again, although it is impossible to determine the actual events that
would follow the deactivation of Microsoft's product activation servers, it is
likely that the market would see an increase in pirated versions of the
software. As a result, unsuspecting public consumers would undoubtably
[sic] suffer some negative consequences.
Under both aspects of z4's proposed permanent injunction, there is a
risk that certain sectors of the public might suffer some negative effects.
However, the Court is unaware of any negative effects that might befall the
public in the absence of an injunction. Although these negative effects are
somewhat speculative, such potential negative effects on the public weigh,
even if only slightly, against granting an injunction. Accordingly, the public
interest is likely to be disserved if a permanent injunction were entered
3 15
against Microsoft.,
Thus, Judge Davis apparently did not at this early date consider the
enforcement of the right to exclude to be in the public interest, unlike several of his
colleagues in Texas.
Finisar Corp. v. DireeTV Group, Inc. 31 6 was decided a few weeks after z4
Technologies. Judge Clark came to similar conclusions as Judge Davis and denied a
permanent injunction to the prevailing patentee, which was awarded patent
infringement damages of almost $104 million (based on a reasonable royalty) and
prejudgment interest of over $13 million.3 17 Instead of a permanent injunction, the
district court ordered a compulsory license of $1.60 per set-top box until the patent
expired. 318 The court's reasons were not given in the publicly-available "Final
Judgment" but appear in oral findings and conclusions dated July 6, 2006.319 That
transcript reveals the court's reasoning for denying the permanent injunction. First,
District Judge Clark commented on the Supreme Court's eBay ruling: "[What] the
Supreme Court said isn't anything new, [they are] just reminding everybody to stop
wandering off the path, get back to... how we've always done injunctions." 320 He
followed, "[wiell, I guess another way you can look at it is the Supreme Court has put
3 21
the law back to where it always has been in injunctions."

Id. at 443.
Id. at 444.
316 No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006).
317 Id. at *4-5.
318 Id.
31) Transcript of Hearing at 12, FinisarCorp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70303 (No. 334).
314

'315

3,20Id.
321

Id. at 80.
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In this case, Finisar kept the rights to the patent and "never made even the
slightest effort to use the patent with any success in the past. ' 22 Given that
damages and future damages were available to plaintiff, the court found that the
3 23
harm was not irreparable.
As to the adequacy of remedies at law, the court found it hard to see how Finisar
had not been fully compensated, particularly in view of the compulsory license the
court ordered.3 24 As to balancing the harms, the Finisarcourt found that the
3 25
hardship on DirecTV would be enormous if an injunction were granted.
Thousands of employees might be out of work, and there would be a ripple effect on
all the content providers, which is "probably incalculable."3 26 Also, 15 million people
would lose the ability to view TV. 3 2 7 In contrast, "Finisar is hard pressed to show
hardship in receiving over $100 million from a patent which has been on a shelf for
some ten years with no return at all, especially when there hasn't been a penny
invested in its development or implementation after issuance, according.., to the
evidence."3 28
Finally, the court saw no public interest served by enjoining
3 29
DirecTV.
Paice L.L.C v. Toyota Motor Corp.3 3 0 is another case from Marshall, Texas
denying a permanent injunction.33 1 This case related to a transmission in hybrid
cars. Finding no irreparable injury, Judge Folsom ruled that harm occurs
irreparably only when the injury cannot be undone by monetary damages.33 2 The
court rejected plaintiffs assertion that its licensing efforts were unsuccessful due to
the lack of an injunction. 333 He went on to say that the reasonable royalty would be
set by the jury.3 3 4 He also ruled that there is no presumption of irreparable harm
that follows automatically from a finding of infringement, citing the Supreme Court
ruling in eBay, stating: "Infringing one's right to exclude alone, however, is
insufficient to warrant injunctive relief."335 The court disagreed that the balancing of
hardships favored plaintiff, noting the "reality" that enjoining the sales of Toyota
automobiles would interrupt Toyota's business and that of related businesses such as
dealers and suppliers. 336
Thus, "defendants face[d] significant hardships if
enjoined."33 7 Interestingly, the court noted that enjoining defendants would "damage
their reputation."3 3 8 This concern for the reputation of the infringer appears to be
322Id.at

124.

123.
Id. at 125.
325Id.

323 Id.at
32

327 Id.

Id.at 126.
Id.
330 No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), afl'd in part, vacated in
part,Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631, 2007 WL 3024994 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).
331 Id.at *1.
33 2 Id. at *5.
333Id.
'328

329

334 Id.

aaId.
336 Id.at *6.
337Id.
338 Id. (emphasis added).
Note that General Motors failed to receive similar treatment in a
previous case. See Christiana Indus. v. Empire Elecs., 443 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
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the first noted expostulation of this notion following eBay. The court thus found the
balance of hardships "decidedly" in favor of defendants. 339 Finally, the court found
the public interest did not weigh heavily in favor of either party. 340 It ruled that non341
injunctive relief also serves the public interest in the enforcement of patent rights.
Defendants failed to show that enjoining the sale of their hybrid vehicles would
disserve the public interest as there are other hybrid alternatives on the market and
there is no evidence present that the demand for hybrid vehicles could not be met by
the alternatives already on the market.3 42 Weighing all four of these factors, the
court ruled that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that injunctive relief was
warranted.4,
The next case denying a permanent injunction is Voda v. Cordis Corp.34 4 This
case involved catheters, and the jury determined that plaintiff was entitled to a
reasonable royalty of 7.5% of defendant's gross sales of infringing devices. 345 The
court noted the eBay requirements and ruled that plaintiff failed to demonstrate
either irreparable injury or the inadequacy of monetary damages. 3 46 The court
rejected the argument that irreparable harm is presumed after validity and
infringement have been established.3 47 Here, plaintiff identified no harm to himself
and argued only the presumption and alleged harm to a non-party, SciMed.3 48 The
court agreed with defendant that this harm to SciMed was irrelevant because that
company elected not to sue to enforce the patent rights and, noting that patents have
the attributes of personal property, the plaintiff must demonstrate harm that is
349
personal (not harm to another).
In Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte FabricatingLtd.,350 which involved tarp systems
for use on flatbed trailers, the court denied a permanent injunction. 351 The patentee
Sundance argued irreparable harm on the basis that defendant competes with
plaintiffs licensees.3 52 The court was not persuaded and noted that Sundance
delayed in filing suit and in seeking injunctive relief. 353 Additionally, the patent
covered just one feature of the accused product, and it could not be said that the
licensees were losing sales to DeMonte because of the infringement of the product at
issue. 354 The court also noted the possibility that lost sales were due to a desire for
the other features of defendant's product or sales lost to other competitors in the
55
marketplace.
3) Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006).

3>o
Id.
341Id.
342 Id.

3:3 Id.
344No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5, 2006).
345Id.

'316 Id.at *5.
347 Id.
3

Id.

350No. 02-73543, 2007 WL 37742 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007).
351Id. at *1.

352Id.at *2.

3 Id.
34 Id.
355Id.
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The court noted that the grant of licenses to others and the offer of a license to
356
DeMonte before filing suit demonstrated that money damages were adequate.
This conduct indicates that Sundance had an interest only in obtaining money
damages. Plaintiff had little proof of hardships tipping in its favor. 357 It argued
358
merely that it had endured a trial and protracted reexamination proceeding.
Against this, the infringer pointed to hardship upon entry of an injunction, "which
would affect its ability to compete with other tarp manufacturers and could force it
out of business." 359 The court found in favor of defendant DeMonte on this factor.360
Finally, while there is a public interest in redressing infringement, in this case an
injunction would harm third parties (DeMonte employees and customers).361 In this
marketplace, the factor did not weigh in favor of the patentee. Hence, the injunction
362
was denied.
In IMXf Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L.C,363 the court denied a permanent injunction
without prejudice to renew it subsequent to any appeal. 364 Chief Judge Sue Robinson
ruled that "outside of the now-overturned presumption that a patent holder is
irreparably harmed upon a finding of infringement, plaintiffs papers contain little
support for its argument that it will suffer irreparable harm." 365 The court noted
that plaintiff offered "no evidence of irreparable harm resulting from defendant's
infringement, for example, market or financial data, to support its sweeping
statements." 366 The court referred to the eBay ruling, which stated that infringing
367
the right to exclude by itself is insufficient to warrant injunctive relief.
Additionally, "there was no indication in the record that defendant's infringement
affected plaintiffs ability to license the technology" of the patent. 368
Further,
"plaintiffs willingness to forego its patent rights for compensation" was not
dispositive yet was "one factor to consider" on the issue of irreparable harm. 369 The
court said that the broad scope of the infringement was "not limited to a minor
component" of the product but that the infringing product completely "mimics the
patented system." 370 The court weighed this factor in favor of an injunction, citing z4
Technologie. 371 As to the public interest, the court found it unable to "reasonably
ascertain whether, and to what extent, the public would be disserved by a permanent
injunction without additional information." 372 In conclusion, the court was reluctant
to determine the issue based on the current record and instead of granting a
350Id.

357See id.
358Id.

35 Id.
360Id.
3 1 Id.
3062
ITd
'363 469

F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007).

364Id.at 228.
365 Id. at 224.
'366
Id.at 225.

367Id.(citing eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1840 (2006)).
308

Id.

369 Jj.

370 ITd
371 Id.

372 Id.at 226.
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compulsory license, offered plaintiff the opportunity to provide additional evidence to
3 73
assist the court in determining the injunction issue.
In Praxair,Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 37 4 Chief Judge Sue Robinson denied entry of a
permanent injunction in a case involving corrosive toxic or otherwise dangerous
gases. 3 75 Praxair contended that defendant stole market share and worked a
substantial and unjustifiable hardship on the patent owner which could not "be
remedied by money damages alone." 37 6 The court, however, found that "Praxair had
not met its burden under eBay to provide sufficient proof' in view of "the broad scope
of the relief requested." 377 Thus, Praxair did not provide or describe any "specific
sales or market data" and did not identify "what market share, revenues and
customers" it lost to defendant.37 8
The court compared the facts to those of
Novozymes A/S v. Geneneor InternationalInc. 3' 9 discussed supra,380 "where [the]
evidence demonstrated that plaintiff originally secured an 80% market share with its
patented product, which fell to approximately 50% after the infringing competitor's
market entry." 38 1 The court noted that "[w]hile money damages are generally
inadequate to compensate for violation of a patentee's right to exclude, Praxair
nevertheless had a burden to iterate specific reasons why [the defendant's]
infringement can not be compensated" by money. 38 2 Judge Robinson ruled that
"Praxair has not explained why it may have 'difficulties calculating damages going
forward."'383 Nor did Praxair describe "how money damages could not adequately
compensate for 'lost market share or any lost research opportunities."'38 4 Thus, in
this case, Praxair had not adduced enough evidence to justify the broad scope of
injunctive relief it was requesting.38 5 The court gave Praxair the right to renew its
motion following appellate review of the jury verdict. 386
Judge Pechman in Washington denied preliminary and permanent injunctions
in Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten.38 7 This case involved the sports ball business and
particularly a game-quality basketball that is cushioned or padded. 388
The
permanent injunction order was decided along with a summary judgment for partial
infringement motion. 38 9 Judge Pechman noted the four factors required to be
considered in eBay and concluded that because Molten had raised genuine issues
regarding obviousness in the present motion, the request for permanent injunctive

37 Id.
'371479 F. Supp. 2d 440 (D. Del. 2007).
375 Id.at 444.
376

Id. at 443.

377 Id.

378Id.

F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007).
See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
381 Praxair,479 F. Supp. 2d at 444 (citing Novozymes AIS, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 598, 613).
382 Id.
379 474
'380

383Id.
384 Id.
385 Id.
386 Id.
387

No. C06210MJP, 2007 WL 2056402, at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2007).

388 Id.
38

Id.at *2.
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relief was premature. 390 Baden at oral argument requested the court to treat its
motion for a permanent injunction as one for a preliminary injunction. 39 1 The court
rejected entering a preliminary injunction for the same reason-that defendant had
raised a genuine issue. 392 In this case, the evidence sufficient to defeat a preliminary
injunction was "a declaration from an individual who claims that he has ordinary
skill in the art, and that it would have been obvious to someone of his skill level to
combine elements of two of Molten's Japanese patents to create Baden's patented
393

design."

Hence, Baden had not established that it is likely to prevail on the merits, and
the judge determined that a preliminary injunction was not warranted. 394 The court
continued, moreover, by stating that Baden had offered no evidence of irreparable
harm that would occur in the less than four weeks before trial was scheduled to
be gin. 395

On remand, in MereExchange, L.L.C v. eBay, Inc., 396 Judge Jerome Friedman
likewise found no irreparable harm. 397 Prior to trial, "MercExchange exhibited a
'lack of commercial activity in practicing the [relevant] patents' and instead exhibited
a 'willingness to license the patents."'398 The willingness to grant licenses, to uBid
399
for example, is "one factor that this court must consider in weighing the equities."

This did not eliminate MercExchange's ability to establish irreparable harm but
weighed against the need for an equitable remedy "as it evidences MercExchange's
willingness to forego its right to exclude in return for money." 400 The district court
also noted that it was concerned because the patent was directed to a business
method, citing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in eBay.40 1 The district court
further noted the Supreme Court opinion in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex,
403
It
Inc., 40 2 rejecting the Federal Circuit's teaching, suggestion and motivation test.
concluded that under KSR, the likelihood that the '265 patent at issue would survive
reexamination at the PTO was diminished. 40 4 This also weighed against a finding of
40 5
irreparable harm.
With regard to the adequacy of remedies at law issue, the MereExehange district
court on remand noted that MercExchange used its '265 patent primarily as a sword
' 40 6
to aid in litigation or threaten litigation against infringers or potential infringers."
390

Id. at 10-11.

391

Id.

at *10.

392Id. at *11.
393Id.
394 Id.
395Id.
396 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).

397 Id. at 591.
'98 Id. at 570 (quoting MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 712 (E.D. Va.
2003)).
399 Id.
400 Id. at 571.
401Id. at 574.
402 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
403 MereExehange, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 574.
404

Id.

405Id. at 575.
406 Id. at 582.
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Using "a ruling in equity as a bargaining chip suggests both that such party never
deserved a ruling in equity and that money is all that such party truly seeks,
407
rendering monetary damages an adequate remedy in the first instance."
In balancing harms, the district court ruled that it was "unclear whether an
injunction would be a significant benefit to MercExchange other than for use as a
bargaining chip." 40 8
"MercExchange ha[d] failed to point to damages to its
reputation, goodwill, brand recognition, customer base, or market share ... caused
by eBay's infringement." 40 9 Thus, the district court concluded that "forced royalties
are an imperfect solution ... [but this] appears to be the most equitable as the patent
holder has repeatedly illustrated that a royalty from market participants, including
' 410
eBay, is what it truly seeks."
The district court in MereExchange weighed the public interest factor slightly
against the plaintiff, i.e., against an injunction. 4 11 The court noted that the "publicinterest factor often favors prevailing patentees, given the public's interest in
maintaining the integrity of the patent system." 412 However, this cannot be allowed
to dominate the analysis and become a presumption. 413 The district court thus
considered the type of patent and its apparent weakness under KSR, and it noted
that public health and welfare are not at issue but that the public interest
nevertheless favored damages instead of an injunction. 414
MercExchange is a
company of only two employees working from home, specializing in obtaining
royalties based on threats of litigation. 4 15 eBay in contrast is a multibillion dollar
company bringing together tens of millions of buyers and sellers, and the company
has a substantial impact on the U.S. economy. 4 16 Further, MercExchange, according
to the district court, had never sought to enforce its right to exclude, and lending
credence to that right, at this late stage of litigation would not serve equity nor the
public interest.417

VII. ALTERNATIVES BEING USED BY COURTS
The courts that have declined to enter permanent injunctions have generally
used two different alternatives: (1) an ongoing royalty, and (2) leave to the patentee
to adduce more evidence or renew its motion, typically following appeal.

407
408

Id.
Id.at 584.

409Id.

Id. at 585.
411 Id.at 586.
412 Id.(quoting Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 14 F. Supp. 2d 785, 795 (E.D. Va. 1998)).
410

413

Id.

Id.at
Id. at
416 Id. at
417 Id.at
414
415

590.
572.
587.
588.
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A.

OngoingRoyalty

The court in z4 Technologies compensated the winning patentee for future
infringement by Microsoft with running royalties determined by the jury:
Such future damages will not be based on injuries that are difficult to
measure such as the loss of market share or damage to brand name
recognition and good will, but will be based on a reasonable royalty for each
of the infringing products sold by Microsoft. This calculation can be made
based on the same reasonable royalty calculation used by the jury at trial
and by referring to Microsoft's internal records showing the number of sales
for the infringing copies of software during the time period. Furthermore, it
is not a legitimate concern that Microsoft would be unable to pay damages
418
incurred by z4 through any future infringement.
On remand, in MereExchange, L.L.C v. eBay, Inc.,419 the district court
concluded that "forced royalties are an imperfect solution ... [but this] appears to be
the most equitable as the patent holder has repeatedly illustrated that a royalty from
420
market participants, including eBay, is what it truly seeks."
In Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp.,42 1 the Federal Circuit found
no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to enter an injunction instead of
422
a forced royalty.
The district court in Paice L.L.C v. Toyota Motor Corp.423 declined to enter a
permanent injunction and instead awarded an ongoing royalty of $25 per unit for
certain vehicles. 424 Recently, the Federal Circuit vacated that part of the ruling
(while affirming the remainder).425 The appellate court explained that the provision
for Toyota to continue to use the patent was not really a "compulsory license," as that
phrase connotes a license open to anyone, whereas in this case, the district court did
not open the patent to licensing by anyone other than Toyota. 426 The Federal Circuit
noted concern over this ruling and admonished that ongoing royalties are not to be
granted as a general rule. 42 7 It cited 35 U.S.C. § 283,428 which states, in relevant
part: "The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
429
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."

418 z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft
419 500 F. Supp. 2d at 556.

Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 442 (E.D. Tex. 2006).

Id. at 585.
503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
422 Id. at 1311.
423 No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), afed in part,
vacated in part,2007 WL 3024994 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 18, 2007) (vacating district court's royalty award).
420

421

The district court opinion is discussed above. See supra notes 330-343 and accompanying text.
424 Paice, 2006 WL 2385139, at *3.
425 Paice, 2007 WL 3024994, at *16-17.
426 Id. at *16 n.13.
427 Id. at *17.
428 Id. at *16.
429 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2006).
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This language on its face imposes an "apparent restriction ... that injunctions
'4
granted thereunder must 'prevent the violation of any right secured by patent." 30
However, the court noted that "[ulnder some circumstances, awarding an ongoing
royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunction may be appropriate." 431 The
court did not find error per se in the ongoing royalty ruling but nevertheless vacated
432
it for failing to articulate sufficient reasons to afford appellate review.

B. Leave to Reopen or Renew
Following a default judgment in KEG Technologies Inc. v. Laimer,433 the court
denied entry of a permanent injunction. 434 Because the decision by the Supreme
Court in eBay occurred on the very same day as an evidentiary hearing, plaintiff was
deemed not to have knowledge that it needed to show all four of the factors identified
by the Supreme Court in eBay.435 Hence, the court ruled that plaintiff had shown
two of the four elements and while it denied entry of a permanent injunction at that
time, it permitted additional evidence and argument respecting the availability of
injunctive relief or "more equitable alternatives (e.g., a compulsory license) ...."436
In IMX, Inc. v. LendingTree, L.L.C,4 37 the court denied a permanent injunction
without prejudice to renew it subsequent to any appeal. 438 The court was reluctant
to determine the issue based on the current record, and instead of granting a

430

Paice, 2007 WL 3024994, at *16 (emphasis added).

431Id.
432 Id.at *17.

The court explained:
Should the parties fail to come to an agreement, the district court could step in to
assess a reasonable royalty in light of the ongoing infringement.
In this case, the district court, after applying the four-factor test for a
permanent injunction and declining to issue one, imposed an ongoing royalty sua
sponte upon the parties. But, the district court's order provides no reasoning to
support the selection of $25 per infringing vehicle as the royalty rate. Thus, this
court is unable to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in
setting the ongoing royalty rate. Accordingly, we think it prudent to remand the
case for the limited purpose of having the district court reevaluate the ongoing
royalty rate. Upon remand, the court may take additional evidence if necessary to
account for any additional economic factors arising out of the imposition of an
ongoing royalty. The district court may determine that $25 is, in fact, an
appropriate royalty rate going forward. However, without any indication as to
why that rate is appropriate, we are unable to determine whether the district
court abused its discretion. Cf Hensley v. Eckerhart,461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.
Ct. 1933, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983) ("It [is] important ... for the district court to
provide a concise but clear explanation of its reasons for the fee award."). The
district court should also take the opportunity on remand to consider the concerns
Paice raises about the terms of Toyota's permissive continuing use.

Id.
433436 F. Supp. 2d 1364 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
434 Id.

at 1371.
Id.
436 Id.
437469 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Del. 2007).
438 Id.at 226.
435

[7:44 2007]

The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law

compulsory license, offered plaintiff the opportunity to provide additional evidence to
439
assist the court in determining the injunction issue.

VIII.

EFFECTS ON PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

As noted in the table supra, courts are split roughly evenly on granting and
denying preliminary injunctions in patent cases subsequent to the Supreme Court's
eBay decision. 440 These cases are reviewed first by splitting them into cases where
the injunctions were granted versus cases where they were denied. Within those
breakdowns, the cases are presented chronologically.

A. PreliminaryInjunetions Granted
The first patent case granting a preliminary injunction after eBay appears to be
Christiana Industries v. Empire Electronics, Inc. 441 This opinion has two distinct
parts. Surprisingly, the July 25, 2006 portion of the opinion appears to have been
written without consideration for the Supreme Court's ruling in eBay. The court
initially ruled that "irreparable harm is presumed when a clear showing of patent
validity and infringement has been made." 442
Defendant simply denied the
allegation, urging that plaintiff would not suffer irreparable harm and that it has
adequate assets to compensate plaintiff with money damages if plaintiff should
prevail. 443 The court ruled the presumption of irreparable harm "weighs in favor of
the preliminary injunction." 444 On the substantial harm issue, the court first cited
financial difficulties and prospective loss of revenue. 445 The court declared that "this
factor does not weigh in favor of either party."446 As for the public interest, the court
ruled that the strong public policy favors enforcing patent rights and weighed in
favor of granting the injunction, dismissing the alleged public interest in favor of the
447
choice of products (lamp sockets) from the supplier of its choice.
On reconsideration, the Christiana court considered eBay and then reaffirmed
the presumption of irreparable harm, at least with respect to preliminary
injunctions:
Plaintiff argues, and this Court agrees, that eBay did not invalidate
the presumption. The eBay Court addressed the proper analysis for
permanent injunctive relief. It held the Court's error by categorically
439Id.
410See supraPart II.
441 443 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Mich. 2006), amended by No. 06-12568, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
54210 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2006).
412 Id.at 882 (citing Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2001)).

44Id.
444

Id.

4 Id.
44(;
Id.
447

Id.
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denying permanent injunctive relief on a showing of infringement and
validity, without analyzing the traditional four factors for injunctive
relief.448
The Court then reasserted that it had weighed the four factors in its decision,
without discussing irreparable harm and apparently continuing to rely on the
presumption of irreparable harm. 449 The Court did not discuss the inadequacy of
legal remedies nor the balancing of harms on reconsideration. As for the public
interest, while defense counsel informed the court that granting injunctive relief
could interrupt General Motors' automobile production, the Court said this evidence
had already been considered and, moreover, plaintiff had offered to license the patent
450
to defendant until some point in time.
In New York, the court in Canon Inc. v. GCC InternationalLtd.4 5 1 granted a
preliminary injunction in a case involving toner cartridges. 452 After citing eBay, the
court discussed irreparable harm, balancing of hardships, and the public interest
(along with determining a likelihood of success on the merits). The court found
irreparable harm because defendants' recycled cartridges are perceived in the
marketplace to have substantially lesser quality. 453
Cross-licenses have been
granted but not for the manufacture and sale of products, and there were no other
competing products in the market. 454 Here, the plaintiff patentee had been able to
price aggressively and competition from defendants was likely to lead to significant
455
price erosion.
The district court considered the location of assets as relevant to the adequacy of
money damages. 456 Here, the court found money damages inadequate "because of
the nature and location of defendants' business," which the court described as "farflung, and locating and attaching assets sufficient to satisfy a money judgment would
457
be exceedingly difficult."
The court rejected the defense of lack of due diligence or undue delay by
458
plaintiff, finding that there was no demonstrable prejudice to defendants.
Balancing hardships, while defendants alleged they would be put out of business
by an injunction of this product line, the court deemed this harm speculative since a
recent product catalog indicated that defendants sell some 350 products, and the
notion that customers would cut defendants off from sales of all products simply
459
because they were unable to sell a few types of toner cartridges is pure conjecture.
In contrast, the loss of profits and market share to the plaintiff is real, not
448 Christiana Indus. v. Empire Elecs., Inc., No. 06-12568, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54210, at *5
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 4, 2006).
449 Id.

450 Id.
451 450 F. Supp. 2d 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, No. 2006-1615, 2007 WL 4005018 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
16, 2007) (non-precedential).
452Id. at 257.
453Id.at 255.
454 Id.
45Id.
456Id.at 256.
457 Id.

458 Id.

45Id.
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speculative, tipping the balance of hardships "decidedly in plaintiffs favor." 460 With
regard to the public interest, the court noted the strong public interest in
enforcement of valid patents and noted that none of the products suffered from
shortages in the marketplace or were necessary to the health, safety, or welfare of a
significant part of the public. 461
Hence, the court granted a preliminary
462
injunction.
The Chief Judge in the District of Nebraska entered a preliminary injunction
against the patentee in GP Industries, Inc. v. Bachman.463 This was a declaratory
judgment action against the patentee, also alleging tortious interference and other
violations. 464 The products at issue were rain gutter covers. 465 The patentee through
counsel sent letters to dealers and wholesale contractors informing them that
plaintiff GPI was planning to manufacture and sell a gutter cover that infringed
defendant's patent. 466
Thereafter, orders totaling more than $600,000 were
rescinded by GPI customers. 467 GPI also showed that its reputation was damaged by
these allegations. 468 In discussing the preliminary injunction, the court noted that
communication to possible infringers concerning patent rights "is not improper if the
patent holder has a good faith belief in the accuracy of the communication." 469 The
court noted the Supreme Court decision in eBay and then found that defendant's
activities approached the bad faith threshold. 470
There was no showing that
defendant's president, Bachman, who allegedly obtained and examined a prototype of
the plaintiffs prototype product, had also examined any product actually sold or
distributedor made any effort to determine that the prototype became the marketed
product. 47 1
GPI established that its business was irreparably harmed by the
accusations from the patentee and its president and established harm to its
reputation and integrity. 472
The court entered an injunction against future
correspondence by co-defendant Eran to present and potential customers during
47 3
pendency of the suit.
In Erico International Corp. v. Docs Marketing Inc., 474 an Ohio court
reaffirmed a preliminary injunction which it had entered twelve days before the
Supreme
Court decision in
eBay.47 5
The enjoined defendant requested
47 6
reconsideration.
Judge O'Malley noted that under eBay, it would be improper for

40
401

Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 257.

462 Id.

463 No. 8:06CV51, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83450, at *15 (D. Neb. Nov. 8, 2006), rev'd, 500 F.3d
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
461 Id. at *2.
465 Id. at *4.
466 Id. at *5.
467 Id. at *6.
468 Id.
469 Id. at *9.
470 Id. at *10.
471 Id. at "13.
472 Id. at *14.
473 Id. at *15.
474 No. 1:05-cv-2924, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1367 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 9, 2007).
475 Id. at *37.
470 Id.
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the Federal Circuit to apply a preliminary injunction standard in patent cases
different than in other cases and further held that while eBay involved a permanent
injunction, the holding was not limited to that context and applies "with even greater
force at the preliminary injunction stage." 477

The court reviewed Federal Circuit

precedents on the preliminary injunction standard, specifically concerning the
478
question of whether defendant had raised a "substantial question" of invalidity.
The court noted confusion in Federal Circuit jurisprudence with regard to invalidity
assertions as defenses to preliminary injunction motions and opined that the primary
source of confusion was that the Federal Circuit had viewed the issue from the
perspective of the defendant rather than that of the plaintiff. 479 "Traditionally, the

preliminary injunction standard is applied from the plaintiffs perspective" 480 and is
similar to the permanent injunction test articulated in eBay.
Judge O'Malley discussed Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.,481 decided after eBay, where the Federal Circuit vacated a preliminary
injunction that had been entered by the district judge. 48

2

That case involved

extended release formulations of a drug, and defendant Teva did not contest
infringement but instead asserted that the claims were obvious. 48 3 The district court
analysis was performed prior to the Supreme Court eBay ruling. The majority
opinion (per Judge Prost, joined by Judge Gajarsa) ruled that if the defendant raises
a substantial question concerning a defense which the movant cannot prove to lack
substantial merit, then the patentee-movant has not established a likelihood of
success on the merits. 48 4 The majority answered Judge Newman's dissent by stating
that the majority was bound by precedent on the lack of substantial merit point
48 5
defeating a likelihood of success.
On the equitable questions incident to granting an injunction, the district court
"presumed Abbott would suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction because of its
conclusion regarding likelihood of success on the merits."

48 6

The district court

further concluded that if a competitor were to enter the market with a generic
extended release formulation, that would likely crush the market. 48 7 The Federal
Circuit noted that because Abbott had not established a likelihood of success on the
merits, it was "no longer entitled to a presumption of irreparable harm."48 8

The

Federal Circuit went on to note that generic competition alone would not establish
that the patentee would suffer irreparable harm. 48 9 The majority concluded that
where a patentee does not show likely success on the merits and has not clearly
established that monetary damages would be insufficient, but that the defendant also
has not established that monetary damages are sufficient, the court cannot say that
477
478

Id. at *21.
Id. at *25.

4 7 Id.

480 Id.
481 452

F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1348.
483 Id. at 1333.
484 Id. at 1335.
485 Id. at 1335 n.2.
486 Id. at 1347.
482

487 Id.
488

Id.

489Id. at

1348.
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the irreparable harm prong favors either party. 490 Additionally, the Federal Circuit
agreed in this case that absent other relevant concerns, it agreed with the district
court "that the public is best served by enforcing patents that are likely valid and
infringed." 491 In this case, however, as Abbott did not establish likely success on the
merits, it concluded that the public interest was best served by denying the
preliminary injunction. 492 In conclusion, the court ruled that Abbott had not
established likely success on the merits, that without the presumption of irreparable
harm and in light of the arguable sufficiency of monetary damages, Abbott has not
established that irreparable harm supports the grant of the injunction, and that as a
substantial question of validity was raised by Teva, the public interest benefits from
493
denial of the injunction.
Senior Judge Moran in Chicago entered a preliminary injunction in
495
Chamberlain Group, Inc. v. Lear Corp.,49 4 a case involving garage door openers.
Judge Moran reached the opposite conclusion from the Michigan court in Christiana
Industrie, 496 supra,497 on the viability of the presumption of irreparable harm. That

is, although the Federal Circuit had previously granted patent holders a presumption
of irreparable harm upon making a clear showing of validity and infringement, the
eBay decision of the Supreme Court has been applied to preliminary injunctions as
well as permanent injunctions. Judge Moran noted that eBay "has been read to limit
the presumption of irreparable harm solely upon the finding of infringement."' 498 The
court then weighed plaintiffs allegations of actual harm by the alleged infringement,
499
namely, market spoliation, price erosion, and strained customer relationships.
The court found that these injuries were real and weighed against defendant's
assertion that plaintiffs alleged no actual harm. 500 The court found that the interest
in maintaining customer relationships and exclusive distributorship weighs in favor
50 1
of a finding of irreparable harm.
The defendant did not rebut these showings but relied instead on plaintiffs'
delay in bringing the preliminary injunction motion. 50 2 Judge Moran rejected this
defense. 503 While conceding that delay is an important factor, it is just one of the
50 4
circumstances a court must consider in the context of the totality of circumstances.
Plaintiff argued persuasively that it was "proceeding with due caution" and the delay
did not outweigh the showing of irreparable harm. 50 5 The court noted further
irreparable harm in plaintiffs unrefuted claims of future potential harm in the form
490 Id.

491
492

Id.

Id.
Id.
494 No. 05 C 3449, 2007 WL 1017751 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2007).
495 Id. at *1.
496 Christiana Indus. v. Empire Elecs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 870 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
497 See supra notes 67-69, 441-450 and accompanying text.
498 Chamberlain Group, 2007 WL 1017751, at *5.
493

499 Id. at *6.

o00Id.
501 Td.

ro02
Id. at *5.
o03 d. at *6.
r04 Id.
o05Id.
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of encouraging other potential infringers to enter the market, the possibility of
confusion between plaintiffs and defendant's products, and further price erosion and
loss of good will.506
On the balancing of hardships, while defendant correctly noted that
withdrawing a product from the market before trial can be devastating, defendant
offered no evidence, with Judge Moran commenting that "defendant failed to enter
one declaration or affidavit with respect to loss of revenue, loss of sales, or loss of
customer good will." 50 7 Accordingly, the court found in favor of plaintiff on the
50 8
balance of hardships.
Defendant asserted a public interest in design-arounds. 50 9
Judge Moran
rejected this defense, noting that the public may be served by encouraging designarounds, but the question of whether defendant had successfully designed around the
patent is an infringement issue, not a public interest issue. 510 Finding no broad
public interest in that, but instead finding a public interest served by enforcing valid
patents, the court found this factor favoring the injunction and thus granted the

motion. 511
A Texas court in Seitz v. Envirotech Systems Worldwide Inc.,512 adhered to a
513
prior preliminary injunction order and denied a motion to dissolve that injunction.
This case mostly concerned defenses to injunctions. Of relevance here, the court
rejected defendant's contention that the patentee Seitz could not show irreparable
harm. 514 Defendant urged that Seitz received a large damage award in another
lawsuit against others who were suppliers for parts used in its water heaters. 515 The
court noted that defendant failed to explain how that damage award affected the
propriety of an injunction against a competitor's future sales of allegedly infringing
516
water heaters.
Turning to the balancing of harms factor, defendant Envirotech asserted that
because of the injunction it has been unable to sell its only product. 517 The court
noted that it is proper to modify an injunction under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 60(b)(5)518 if a party could show a significant change in factual conditions or the

5oGd.

at *7.

507Id.
o0SId.at *8.

5oOId. at *7.
510 d.

511 Id.
512 No. H-02-4782, 2007 WL 1795683 (S.D. Tex. June 19, 2007).
51 Id.at "1.
514 Id.at *3.
515Id.
516Id.

517Id.at *4.
518Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(b) states in relevant part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: ...(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged,
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application; ....
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law. 519 However, it is insufficient to show that the enjoined party would be "better
off' if the injunction were lifted. 5 20
Instead, the enjoined party must show an
extreme and unexpected hardship to such an extent as to justify characterizing them
as victims of oppression. 521 The court ruled that the present record failed to show
unexpected or extreme changes in the factual conditions or to defendant's financial
situation that would justify dissolving the injunction. 522 In conclusion, the court
denied the motion to dissolve its prior preliminary injunction.523
On November 16, 2007, the Federal Circuit affirmed the grant of a preliminary
injunction in Canon Inc. v. GCC InternationalLtd.5 24 The court refined the inquiry a
court must make when ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, stating:
At the preliminary injunction stage, irreparable harm consists of harm
that could not be sufficiently compensated by money damages or avoided by
a later decision on the merits. To reach an irreparable harm balance, a trial
court compares the irreparable harm that would be sustained by the
movant if a preliminary injunction were erroneously denied with the
irreparable harm that would be sustained by the non-movant if a
preliminary injunction were granted in error.525
Applying this formulation, when considering the plaintiffs irreparable harm in
this case, the Federal Circuit noted likely price erosion and loss of market share from
defendants' competition.5 26 Money damages would be inadequate because these
injuries would be difficult or impossible to quantify, and, in any event, as the trial
court had noted, recovering money damages from defendants was uncertain because
their operations were geographically "far-flung."' 527 In contrast, defendants would
suffer little harm through an erroneously-granted preliminary injunction that could
not be recovered in damages from Canon under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule
65(c).528 Hence the irreparable harm balance favored plaintiff.529
The Federal Circuit cited Fourth Circuit law on how to make the "ultimate
decision in a preliminary injunction context," stating:
"If, after balancing [the irreparable harm to plaintiff against that of the
defendant], the balance tips decidedly in favor of the plaintiff, a preliminary
injunction will be granted if the plaintiff has raised questions going to the

519Seitz, 2007 WL 1795683, at *4.
520Id.
521 Id.

5'2
2 _Td.
523Id.
524 No. 2006-1615, 2007 WL 4005018 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2007).
525 Id. at *3 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES 187, 193-94 (2d ed. 1993)).
526 Id. at *4.
52 7 Id.
502
8 Id.
529 Id.
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merits so serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair
5 °
ground for litigation and thus for more deliberate investigation." 3
The Court next cited Seventh Circuit law for the "sliding scale" approach to the
ultimate balance-as the irreparable harm balance favors the plaintiff more greatly,
the smaller the showing
of likely success on the merits the plaintiff needs to make to
"get the injunction." 531 The Federal Circuit found no abuse of discretion by the
district court. 532

B. PreliminaryInjunctions Denied
Several post-eBay district courts declined to grant preliminary injunctions in
patent cases.
First, in Docusign, Inc. v. Sertif4 Inc., 533 the question of irreparable harm arose
but was rejected on the facts because the plaintiff had not made a strong showing of
likely success. 534 The district court in Docusign noted the argument that no
presumption of harm is proper following eBay, however the court relied on Abbott
Laboratoriesv. Andrx Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,53 5 a post- eBay Federal Circuit decision
in which the court "assumed (without deciding) that such a presumption was still
appropriate in the preliminary injunction context, where a strong showing of likely
infringement was made." 53 6 Plaintiffs claim of irreparable harm was weakened by
(1) the failure to offer evidence in support thereof, together with (2) its apparent
delay, which undermined the claim of irreparable harm. 53 7 Plaintiff failed "to cite a
single instance where Sertifi's competition has undermined its participation in the
53 8
marketplace."
On the balance of hardships, the court said that without a strong showing of
likely infringement, plaintiff must demonstrate that the balance of hardships tips in
its favor. 539 Also, defendant contended that an injunction would put it out of
business since its entire business was providing document signature services using
the challenged system. 540
The court found that that argument overcame a
speculative loss of market share alleged by plaintiff. 54 1 The court was reluctant to
enjoin the defendant "without the benefit of a trial or proper claim construction, for a
lengthy asserted claim." 542 Interestingly, the court found that the same reasons
adversely affected the public interest "by putting a corporation out of business on a
530 Id. (quoting Direx Isr., Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 813 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Id. (citing Kowalski v. Chi. Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 170 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Id.
53 468 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (W.D. Wash. 2006).
531 Id. at 1310.
53 452 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
536 Docusign, 468 F. Supp. 2d at 1310 n.6 (citing AbbottLab s., 452 F.3d at 1347-48 (Fed. Cir.
531

532

2006).

537 Id.
53 Id.
39 Id.
540 Id.
541 Id,
542

Id.
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meager showing of necessity." 543 For these reasons, Judge Zilly declined the motion
544

for preliminary injunction.
Senior District Judge Ackerman in New Jersey declined to enter a preliminary
injunction in Novartis Corp. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals U.S.A., Inc. 545 This case
involved a prescription medication for the treatment of hypertension and Teva's
generic version thereof. 546

The court said that Novartis had not made a strong

showing of probable infringement or reasonable likelihood of success on the merits
and was, therefore, "not afforded the presumption of irreparable harm." 547 The court
did not discuss eBay in this context. The court noted competing expert declarations
on the damages issue and ruled that it was "not prepared to settle the battle of the
economic experts today," indicating basically that where the experts were discussing
the estimated monetary losses, this undercut plaintiffs claim that its losses would be
"'unquantifiable with any degree of specificity."' 548 The court noted the dispute over
whether there would be irreversible price erosion and lost business and research
prospects, stating that the possibility of these factors does not alone demand a
preliminary injunction, especially where these losses appear to be calculable. 549 With
regard to the lost research opportunities argument, the court noted Federal Circuit
precedent that any manufacturer with any research and development program could
make the same claim and demand a preliminary injunction, thereby converting the
"extraordinary" remedy of a preliminary injunction into a standard remedy, available
550
whenever the plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits.
Regarding the balancing of hardships, Novartis asserted that Teva was fully
aware of the patent when it filed its Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA")
and could blame only itself; further, Teva's hardship is minimal because a
preliminary injunction would merely preserve the status quo. 551 The court noted
that subsequently, Teva was granted final approval from the Federal Drug
Administration ("FDA") to market its generic version of the drug, thus changing the
facts. 552 The court noted that if Teva were to be enjoined from selling its generic
products until a trial on the merits, it may lose a large portion or even the entirety of
its 180-day exclusivity. 553

The court also noted that Novartis could have filed its

preliminary injunction motion as early as July 11, 2006 when Teva received
preliminary approval for its generic drug application, but instead Novartis waited
until March 27, 2007 to seek an injunction. 554 The court nevertheless found that the
balance of hardships tipped in favor of Novartis because its patent would expire in

5

Id.

544
545

Id.
Nos. 04-4473, 06-1130, 2007 WL 1695689 (D.N.J. June 11, 2007).

516

Id. at *1.

547

Id. at *26.
Id. at *27 (quoting Plaintiffs Reply Brief at 24).

548

5 9 Id.

o50Id. at *28 (see, e.g., Eli Lilly and Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
551 Id. at *29.
552 Id.
53 Id.
54

Id. at *30.
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approximately ten years and the company has a strong interest in enforcing the
555
patent throughout its remaining useful lifetime.
The court agreed that the public interest in low-cost generic drug alternatives
must be balanced by its interest in the protection of patent rights. 556 Given the
question as to Teva's infringement, the court found that Novartis failed to carry its
burden on the public interest factor. 557 In conclusion, while Novartis (the patentee)
may suffer more hardship than Teva absent a preliminary injunction, Novartis failed
to carry its burden with regard to a reasonable likelihood of success, irreparable
harm, and impact on the public interest. 558 For these reasons, the court vacated all
559
restraining orders and denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
A design patent was at issue in Torspo Hockey International,Inc. v. Kor Hockey
Ltd.560 District Judge Schiltz in Minnesota ruled that Kor (the patentee) had failed
to show that it was likely to succeed in the patent litigation, and the court therefore
must deny its motion for a preliminary injunction. 561 The court therefore limited its
discussion of the other preliminary injunction factors. 562 As to irreparable harm, the
court noted that while the Supreme Court ruling in eBay related to a permanent
injunction, the district court believed that the Supreme Court's "logic forbids courts
to categorically presume irreparable harm in the preliminary-injunction context,
563
On the
even if a patentee has established that it will likely succeed on the merits."
merits of irreparable harm, the court was not persuaded by allegations of harm as a
564
result of customer confusion as between the two ice skates involved in the suit.
The court looked at the details of the products (skates) and found that an ordinary
observer would consider the bases of the skates to be ornamentally very similar, but
that alone would not mislead customers as to who made each skate, since the base is
just one element of the appearance of the skate. 565 The court ruled that the upper
portions of the skates were not confusingly similar and bore prominent logos, which
566
the court deemed relevant to the question of irreparable harm.
The court also rejected the assertion that the patentee's reputation for
innovation or uniqueness would be irreparably harmed, even by infringing
activities. 567 The court discounted this because the patent in suit was a design
patent, not a utility patent. 568 To the extent Kor is developing a reputation for
functionally innovative products, that reputation is not impacted by design patent
infringement. 569 On the other hand, the court found in favor of Kor on the balance of
hardships, noting that Torspo had not explained what hardship it would suffer from
555Id.at *31.
556 Id.
557Id.

58 Id.at *32.
559 Id.

560 491 F. Supp. 2d 871 (D. Minn. 2007).
561
Id.at 881.
562 Id.
56: Id.
564 Id.
5 Id.

566 Id.
567Id. at 882.
569 Id.
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the entry of a preliminary injunction if Kor were likely to prevail on the merits. 570
The court found in favor of Kor, the patentee, on the public interest factor because
the case involved hockey skates rather than lifesaving drugs or the like. 571 However,
the court ruled that these two factors are not sufficient to justify a preliminary
injunction where Kor, the patentee, has not established likely success on the merits
nor irreparable harm absent an injunction. 572 For these reasons, the court denied
573
the patentee's motion for preliminary injunction.
Baden Sports, Inc. v. Molten 574 denied a preliminary injunction and is discussed
SUpa.

5 75

Chief District Judge Mordue in the Northern District of New York adopted a
magistrate judge's report and recommendation and denied a preliminary injunction
in Pass & Seymour, Inc. v. Hubbell Inc. 576 The case involved electrical wiring
products. 577 The magistrate judge found serious questions as to the validity of the
claims of the patent and found that plaintiff had not demonstrated likely success on
the merits. 578 On the question of irreparable harm, the magistrate judge noted the
Supreme Court ruling in eBay but then stated, "[in a case of this nature, however,
the law presumes the existence of such irreparable injury when a strong showing of
likelihood of success on the merits has been made." 57 9 The court did not invoke this
presumption in view of its other findings and thus analyzed irreparable harm
according to a traditional analysis. 580 The court rejected plaintiffs arguments that
denial of a preliminary injunction is the functional equivalent of a forced license and
that it would cause plaintiff to lose market share and negate the advantage of its
innovation and efforts to promote its own product. 581 The court said these arguments
were not particularly persuasive, as the potential loss of sales is not the kind of
"special circumstances" sufficient to establish irreparable harm. 58 2
Though
challenging to quantify, lost sales resulting from competition by Hubbell through
58 3
infringement would be compensable as an element of damages.
The magistrate also rejected complaints of price erosion, staff reduction, and loss
of research and development, noting that in the cases relied upon by plaintiff, the
patentee had demonstrated a likely success on the merits, "thereby implicating a
presumption of irreparable harm." 58 4 The cases cited by plaintiff were readily
distinguishable and in view of the court's finding of serious questions regarding
5o7 Id.
57,Id.
572

Id.

57 3 Id.

571No. C06-210MJP, 2007 WL 2056402 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2007).
575 Id.at *11; see supra note 387-395 and accompanying text.
576 No. 5:07-CV-0272, 2007 WL 2172648, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007).
577 Id.
,78 Id.at *9.
,79 Id.
580 Id.
581lId.

r82 Id. ([N]either the difficulty of calculating losses in market share, nor speculation that such
losses might occur, amount to proof of special circumstances justifying the extraordinary relief of
injunction prior to trial." (quoting Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 871 (Fed. Cir. 1991))).

r48
Id.a
o84 Id
at *10.
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patent validity, plaintiff could not reap the benefit of the presumption of irreparable
5 5
harm and the corresponding case law. 8
Both parties argued a hardship, and the court ruled that this factor was neutral
at best but probably weighed more heavily in favor of defendant. 58 6 The court
weighed the public interest in favor of defendant, noting the anticompetitive aspects
of patents, the disservice to the public of removing what may well be a non-infringing
product from the market, and noting that the primary users of the quick-connect
materials are hospitals and educational institutions. 587 Weighing all these factors,
the magistrate judge recommended denial of a preliminary injunction, and Chief
58 8
Judge Mordue agreed.
Chief District Judge Robinson in Delaware denied a preliminary injunction
motion in Sun Optics, Inc. v. FGX International,Ine.589 After noting eBay, the court
stated that the plaintiff-movant was required to establish its right to a preliminary
injunction. 590
With regard to irreparable harm, if the moving party fails to
demonstrate likely success on the merits, it must clearly establish that monetary
damages would not be sufficient. 591
The court rejected the presumption of
irreparable harm, stating, "Ie]ven if the moving party succeeds in demonstrating a
likelihood of success on the merits, the notion that there follows a presumption of
irreparable harm seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding in
eay

"592
......

The court noted that the public interest factor, absent other relative concerns,
generally follows the likelihood of success determination. 593 In this case, the plaintiff
relied on a presumption of irreparable harm, which the court rejected. 594 The court
also noted that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proving likely success on the
merits and thus, even if there were a presumption, plaintiff would not be entitled to
595
it.
Notwithstanding that the accused product allegedly is taking market share
from one of plaintiffs products, the court was not persuaded regarding the economic
role of the commercial embodiments of the patents in suit. 596 Balancing the
hardships and public interest, the court found that these factors also do not favor
59
imposing a preliminary injunction.

C Recent FederalCireuitEn Bane Comments

585Id.

586 Id. at *11.
587 Id.
588 Id.

58) Civ. No. 07-137-SLR, 2007 WL 2228569, at *1 (D. Del. Aug. 2, 2007).
5o See id.
591Id. (citing Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
592Id.
593 Id. at *2.
59)4
Id. at *3.
595 Id.
597 Id.

, Id at *4.
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The August 20, 2007 Federal Circuit en bane ruling in In re Seagate Technology,
L.L. C., 59S articulates new standards for finding willfulness and the scope of waivers
that results from producing attorney opinions. 599 However, a portion of the en bane
opinion is directed to preliminary injunctions and is reproduced here:
[W]hen an accused infringer's post-filing conduct is reckless, a patentee
can move for a preliminary injunction, which generally provides an
adequate remedy for combating post-filing willful infringement .... A
patentee who does not attempt to stop an accused infringer's activities in
this manner should not be allowed to accrue enhanced damages based solely
on the infringer's post-filing conduct. Similarly, if a patentee attempts to
secure injunctive relief but fails, it is likely the infringement did not rise to
the level of recklessness.
We fully recognize that an accused infringer may avoid a preliminary
injunction by showing only a substantial question as to invalidity, as
opposed to the higher clear and convincing standard required to prevail on
the merits. ("Vulnerability is the issue at the preliminary injunction stage,
while validity is the issue at trial. The showing of a substantial question as
to invalidity thus requires less proof than the clear and convincing showing
necessary to establish invalidity itself."). However, this lessened showing
simply accords with the requirement that recklessness must be shown to
recover enhanced damages. A substantial question about invalidity or
infringement is likely sufficient not only to avoid a preliminary injunction,
but also a charge of willfulness based on post-filing conduct.
We also recognize that in some cases a patentee may be denied a
preliminary injunction despite establishing a likelihood of success on the
merits, such as when the remaining factors are considered and balanced. In
that event, whether a willfulness claim based on conduct occurring solely
600
after litigation began is sustainable will depend on the facts of each case.
This passage, among other things, seems to suggest that post-filing
"recklessness" by the accused infringer is a basis to move for a preliminary
injunction. Further, the statement that "when the remaining factors are considered
and balanced" could suggest that the presumption of irreparable harm is not used.
Without doubt, the Supreme Court will provide an explicit articulation on this point
in due course.

IX. EBAYAND NON-PATENT CASES

59S
59

497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1367.

6OO
Id. at 1374 (citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court's ruling in eBayis being considered in all types of injunction
cases outside the patent field. They are not discussed in detail herein, but include
the following cases:
"
*
*
*
*
*

*
*
*

60 1
Advance Magazine Publishers,Inc. v. Leach
60 2
Burgess v. Gilman
60 3
CanadianLumber Trade Alliance v. UnitedStates
604
Lava Records L.L. C v. AteS
60 5
Microsoft Corp. v. McGee
60 6
MyGym, L.L. C. v. Enge
07
NationalLeague ofJunior Cotillions,Inc. v. Porte
608
O'Sullivan v. City of Chicago
60 9
WarnerBros. Entertainment,Inc. v. Carsagno

CONCLUSION
The reported cases support several conclusions. On the issue of irreparable
harm, direct competition between the litigants in the patented product or process
weighs heavily in determining irreparable harm. 610 Factors which courts look to as
bearing on irreparable harm include lost sales of the patentee, 61 1 erosion or loss of
market share or a stifled opportunity to develop a market position in the patented
product,6 12 damage to reputation for innovation, 613 and the opportunity to maintain
one's own product as an industry standard. 6 14 When there is no direct competition,
6;01466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 628 (D. Md. 2006) (copyright; preliminary injunction granted).
02 475 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1063 (D. Nev. 2007) (trademark; permanent injunction granted).
603 441 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1259 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2006) (anti-dumping/custom duties; injunction
granted).
604 No. Civ.A. 05-1314, 2006 WL 1914166, at *4 (W.D. La. July 11, 2006) (copyright; injunction
granted).
60, 490 F. Supp. 2d 874, 874 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (copyright, trademark; permanent injunction
granted).
606 No. 1:06-CV-130 TC, 2006 WL 3524474, at *13 (D. Utah Dec. 6, 2006) (trademark;
preliminary injunction denied).
607 No. 3:06-CV-508-RJC, 2007 WL 2316823, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2007) (non-compete
agreement, trademark infringement, copyright infringement; preliminary injunction granted).
608 478 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1034 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (racial discrimination; injunction granted).
(301)
No. 06 CV 2676(NG)(RLM), 2007 WL 1655666, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2007) (copyright;
permanent injunction entered).
(310See, e.g., Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 983 (W.D. Tenn.
2006); Visto Corp. v. Seven Networks, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 WL 3741891, at *4 (E.D.
Tex. Dec. 19, 2006).
(311See, e.g., Wald v. Mudhopper Oil Field Servs., Inc., No. CIV-04-1693-C, 2006 WL 2128851,
at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006); Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., No. 02-73543, 2007
WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007).
(312 See, e.g., Wald, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5; TiVo Inc. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F.
Supp. 2d 664, 669-70 (E.D. Tex. 2006); Smith & Nephew, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 983; Black & Decker
Inc. v. Robert Bosch Tool Corp., No. 04 C 7955, 2006 WL 3446144, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006).
(313 Se, e.g., Wal d , 2006 WL 2128851, at *5; Smith &Nephew, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 981; Black &
Decker, 2006 WL 3446144, at *4.
(314 See, e.g,., Wald, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5.
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courts are less likely to enter injunctive relief. 615 Courts generally do not recognize
as direct competition situations where the patented invention is only a small part of
the infringing product. 616 The patentee must show how it is losing market share,
goodwill, or the like. 617 Courts may dismiss harm that is not personal to the
618
patentee, i.e., harm to another.
In other instances, there is no direct competition between the parties, but the
patentee is a research institution or other entity which does not actually practice the
patent. Injunctive relief may still be appropriate, as irreparable harm can be shown
by damage to reputation, by lost opportunities, diverted "business," and other factors
akin to damage to goodwill.
Thus, it is improper to reject categorically the
opportunity of a research institution to obtain equitable relief or as incapable of being
irreparably harmed.
On the issue of the adequacy of a monetary remedy, courts often look to the
same factors mentioned above regarding the irreparable harm issue. Some judges
hold simply that money damages (a legal remedy) cannot replace the exclusionary
right (the patent right). This, however, seems to beg the question of how to apply the
standard principles of equity, i.e., the four factors. Some courts require a monetary
remedy to be "plain and adequate" or as practical and efficient to the ends of justice
and its administration as the legal remedy before it will be deemed "adequate."
Courts will often find money damages inadequate to account for lost market share
and damaged goodwill or reputation. One question would be, for example, whether
the patentee proves that it is suffering harm beyond what it would recover as a
reasonable royalty. Additionally, at least one court has ruled that when it is difficult
to determine future damages, this favors the patentee. 619 Inadequacy of monetary
remedies may arise from high levels of difficulty the patentee may have in levying
620
against an infringer's assets that are outside the United States and "far-flung."
On the other hand, a patentee's offer of a royalty-bearing license before filing suit is a
factor indicating that money damages are adequate. 621 The sufficiency of a monetary
remedy is not treated as a defense to a motion but instead as part of the patentee's
burden, and the patentee must provide proof that money damages would be
insufficient.

622

6151
Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc. 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006); z4 Techs., Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437, 440 (E.D. Tex. 2006), affd, No. 2006-1638, 2007 WL 3407175
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2007).
i6 See, e.g., 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex Sec., Ltd., No. 6:02-cv-1354-Orl-28DAB, 2007 WL
1101238, at *7 (M.D. Fla. April 12, 2007); Sundance, 2007 WL 37742, at *2.
617 See supratext accompanying notes 481-487.
618 See Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 WL 2570614, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 5,
2006).
619 See Brooktrout Inc. v. Eicon Network Corp., No. 2:03CV59, 2007 WL 1730112, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. June 14, 2007).
620 See Canon Inc. v. GCC Int'l Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 2d 243, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), affd, No. 20061615, 2007 WL 4005018 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 16, 2007) (nonprecedential).
621 See Sundance, 2007 WL 37742, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 4, 2007); see also MercExchange,
L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 571 (E.D. Va. 2007).
622 See Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007).
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In weighing relative hardships, courts have looked for specific evidence of how
parties would be harmed by an injunction or lack thereof. 623

This may include

determining whether the product at issue is the core business of a party (making it
more important).624 Courts look at the effects an injunction would have if the
infringer or alleged infringer is enjoined. On the other hand, courts often rule that
an infringer cannot develop equities in permitting continued infringement. 625 Yet, in
cases where there is no direct competition and no irreparable harm to the patentee, a
balancing of harms may tip in favor of the infringer who may show interrupted sales,
62 6
supply chain issues, damage to reputation, etc., as in the Paiee v. Toyota case.
The egregiousness of a defendant's conduct in infringing the patent seems to be
disregarded, or at least not discussed, in the balancing of equities. While it seems
logical to disregard the fact that infringement may be innocent or debatable, query
whether it would be proper to weigh equities against the infringer for egregious
actions.

On the public interest factor, district judges have wide discretion and hold
varying opinions on whether the public interest is best served by enjoining further
infringement, thereby to strengthen the patent system and discourage infringement
in general. 627 Several courts have ruled that issuance of an injunction serves the
public interest (or fails to disserve it) because it provides an adequate remedy to a
628
patentee or because of a strong public policy in favor of enforcing patent rights.
Courts are divided on whether the presumption of irreparable harm survived
eBay.629

That presumption is generally more important in deciding preliminary

injunction motions, but it also applies in considering permanent relief. While courts
fall on both sides of the question, 630 the better reasoned view appears to be that the
presumption has no continued viability. First, it is difficult to accept that a patentee
should benefit before trialfrom a presumption that assists in obtaining an injunction
against the alleged infringer during the litigation, while on the other hand, the test
for granting permanent injunctive relief (after trial) is more rigorous-even though
more certainty has been obtained by virtue of a verdict or judgment of infringement.
It should be harder,not easier, for a patentee to obtain injunctive relief before trial
rather than after trial, and giving a presumption to the patentee necessarily makes
obtaining an injunction easier. Second, raising a presumption of irreparable harm
seems inconsistent with the reasoning in the Supreme Court's ruling in eBa/331 and,
62:3 See

Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 983-84 (W.D. Tenn.

2006).
24 See 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex See., Ltd., No. 6:02ev1354Orl28DAB, 2007 WL 1101238, at
*7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 12, 2007).
625 See, e.g., Brooktrout Inc. v. Eicon Networks Corp., No. 2:03CV59, 2007 WL 1730112, at *2
(E.D. Tex. June 14, 2007); Allan Block Corp. v. E. Dillon & Co., No. 04-3511, 2007 WL 2409669, at
*13 (D. Minn. Aug. 20, 2007).
626 Paice L.L.C. v. Toyota Motor Corp., No. 2:04-CV-211-DF, 2006 WL 2385139, at *6 (E.D. Tex.
Aug. 16, 2006), affd in part, vacated in part,Nos. 2006-1610, 2006-1631, 2007 WL 3024994 (Fed.
Cir. Oct. 18, 2007).
627 See, e.g., TiVo Corp. v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664, 670 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
628 See, e.g., Christiana Indus. v. Empire Elecs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 2d 870, 882 (E.D. Mich.
2006).
629 See supraParts IV.B, IV.C.
G30 Id.
i(1 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1841 (2006).
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moreover, appears to be a prohibited "categorical rule." Nevertheless, some district
courts have adhered to and applied the presumption.632
The Federal Circuit (or Supreme Court) needs to speak definitively on the
presumption question. The Federal Circuit's 2006 decision in Abbott Laboratories,
supra,633 could have addressed the issue directly but avoided the issue by stating

that the conditions for raising the presumption had not been established. 634 This was
a lost opportunity, but the court may have wanted the issue to percolate in the
district court before settling the question. Even so, it seems clear to many district
judges that the Supreme Court tacitly overruled any presumption of irreparable
harm to a patentee arising simply by the patentee showing of success on the
merits.

63 5

If a patentee must demonstrate irreparable harm after proving liability,

why should less be needed before the patentee proves its case?
Regarding defenses, courts do not accept the statement that the defendant has
stopped the infringing activity. 636 Instead, courts look for concrete evidence that the
defendant cannot infringe. 637 For example, if the defendant still has manufacturing
capacity, an injunction may be in order. 638 If, however, defendant had a mold that it
modified to avoid infringement, and if defendant has zero remaining inventory of
infringing products, so that further direct infringement would require changing the
mold back to its former state, a court could decide that no injunction is necessary to
protect the right to exclude.
Further concerning defenses, at least one court was not sufficiently moved by
aggressive behavior of the patentee in respect of the market for the patented
goods. 639 Nevertheless, old principles of equity may someday be invoked, viz., one
must "do equity" to "obtain equity," no equitable relief to a petitioner with unclean
hands, etc.
Finally, when patentees have proven infringement-even willful infringementand the courts deny injunctive relief, they have provided for an ongoing royalty for
continued infringement. 640 Alternatively, they have granted leave to renew following
any appeal, sometimes offering the patentee the opportunity to provide additional
641
evidence.

32

See supraPart IV.C.

See supratext accompanying notes 38-49.
Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 452 F.3d 1331, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
6 See supraPart IV.B.
63 See Wald v. Mudhopper Oil Field Servs., Inc., No. CIV041693C, 2006 WL 2128851, at *5
(W.D. Okla. July 27, 2006).
6
631

G37 Id.

( See GP Indus., Inc. v. Bachman, No. 8:06CV51, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83450, at *15 (D.
Neb. Nov. 8, 2006), rev'd, 500 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
(340 See

supraPart VlI.A.

(341IMX,

Inc. v. LendingTree L.L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d 203, 226 (D. Del. 2007).

